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I.

Introduction
From 2007-2012, El Salvador had the highest average female homicide rate in the world.

While much of the spotlight has been on male gang-related homicides, this paper shifts the focus
to the alarming violence that women in El Salvador experience. What explains the skyrocketing
female homicide rate in El Salvador over the past 10-15 years? To answer and more deeply
engage with this contemporary research question, I unearth the historical roots and causal
factors. First, I explore the long-term effects of the civil war (1980-1992), the proliferation of
organized crime and gangs, and women’s access to resources in El Salvador as potential
contributors toward heightened amounts of violence against women (VAW). Second, I analyze
the Salvadoran government’s response to this VAW epidemic, focusing on legislation and the
degree to which it has been effective in mitigating VAW levels. Lastly, I highlight how
autonomous women’s organizations in El Salvador hold the government accountable by
demanding policies that protect women from VAW and promote women’s safety in society. I
find that providing women with access to more resources—educational and organizational—may
be a key way to advance the status of women within El Salvador.
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Background

II.

Gang violence, mostly perpetrated by men against other men, has contributed to El
Salvador being one of the most dangerous countries in the world to be a woman. Although more
men are killed than women in El Salvador, the country’s female homicide rate, as seen in Figure
1, is higher on average than all other countries in Latin America—a region that already suffers
from extreme VAW rates (World Bank 2017, Widmer and Pavesi 2016).
Figure 1. Latin America: Intentional Female Homicides (per 100,000 female), 2005-2017
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

El Salvador
Peru
Belize

Guatemala
Venezuela, RB
Argentina

Honduras
Ecuador
Chile

Nicaragua
Colombia
Cuba

Dominican Republic
Bolivia
Mex ico

Paraguay

Uruguay

Puerto Rico

Panama

Costa Rica

World Bank (2005-2017)

Examining El Salvador’s history is key in understanding its contemporary levels of
VAW. This chapter serves as a historical frame, providing the necessary information to grasp El

2017
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Salvador’s deeply rooted ‘history of violence.’1 To do this, I first provide an overview of pre-war
El Salvador (1900-1979), highlighting the rampant state-sanctioned violence and repression that
characterized this period. Next, I discuss the 12-year civil war (1980-1992) that left the nation
deeply psychologically, politically, and economically wounded. The post-war period, as I
mention, did not adequately address the grievances of the war, and its unstable conditions
ultimately led to the proliferation of gangs within the country. These gangs (MS-13 and B-18)
strengthened and organized in response to repressive police tactics and mass-imprisonment. They
now hold El Salvador in an economic chokehold, and terrorize communities with threats of
violence. I next briefly examine historical gender dynamics within the country, underscoring
how Salvadoran male identities are constructed around violence. Lastly, I provide definitions of
‘feminicide,’ ‘intersectionality,’ ‘gender inequality,’ and ‘weak state,’ and discuss their relevance
to my study.

i.

Pre-War (1930-1979)
In order to better understand the state of El Salvador’s society today, I open my

discussion with an examination of the timeframe around the civil war. Salvadoran society prewar was characterized by deeply ingrained political exclusion, and economic and social divisions
between a rural, poor majority and a handful of oligarchic elites (Kurtenbach 2013). These
cleavages were present in the early 20th century, and only intensified over the years. Agricultural
land for El Salvador’s main export, coffee, was concentrated in the hands of elite plantation
owners. This small ruling class of landed elites are often referred to as ‘las catorce,’ or ‘the
fourteen families,’ an exaggeration, but not far-fetched (Mason 1986, Rosenberg 1991).

1

In reference to Óscar Martínez’s A History of Violence: Living and Dying in Central America
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Menjívar Ochoa (2005) notes that by 1930, coffee-processing was almost completely dominated
by twenty-four family groups (130). Over time, disenfranchised peasant groups mobilized and
their efforts culminated in a major uprising in 1932, in which state forces murdered over 30,000
peasants2, the majority of whom were indigenous Pipil peoples (Wood 2003, Hume 2009, 7).
This massacre, known as La Matanza, serves as just one example of state violence in El
Salvador’s recent history. Although the massacre occurred almost 90 years ago, La Matanza
remains “etched into the nation’s collective memory” (Hume 2009, 7). From this point on, any
attempt to disrupt the status quo that favored the oligarchic elites evoked a military response
from the state. A series of military dictatorships controlled El Salvador from 1931-1979, and
economic inequality continued to intensify. By 1979, 2% of the population controlled 60% of the
land (Schulz and Graham 1985).
The marginalized status of the majority of Salvadorans, coupled with their frustrations
around land ownership, social and economic inequalities, and lack of political power led to the
formation of social movements in response to the government’s indifference to their grievances
(Kurtenbach 2013). In a time of economic modernization, these already divisive cleavages were
exacerbated and eventually led revolutionary forces to form and demand the state’s attention.
By the late 1970’s, insurgent ranks had grown, and non-state actors began to assemble
resources and territory in their struggle against the U.S.-aligned Salvadoran elite. These leftist
guerilla groups operated separately, but eventually collaborated to form the Marxist coalition
known as the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front, or FMLN). Roman Catholic clergy members (most notably, Archbishop Óscar

2

Scholars conjecture that 2% of the Salvadoran population at the time was murdered by state
forces in La Matanza (Stanley 1996, Paige 1994, Hume 2009, 7).
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Romero) also spoke out against the social injustices, and used liberation theology3 to encourage
students, peasants, and civilians to unite against the state-enforced repression (Musalo 2018).
Increasing state-sanctioned abuses, political corruption, and a failed coup by reformist military
officers brought tensions between the radical left and oligarchic elite to a peak in 1979, leading
to the official start of the country’s civil war a year later.

El Salvador must also be understood within the larger context of the Cold War. The civil
wars which erupted across Central America were manifestations of ideological battles between
the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. Similar to El Salvador, these proxy wars that ravaged Guatemala
and Nicaragua in the 1980’s were also results of intense state repression, coupled with political
and social exclusion. These grievances ultimately led to the formations of insurgent Sovietsupported guerrilla groups (in Nicaragua, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional [FSLN],
and in Guatemala, the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca [URNG]) which fought
against U.S.-supported state forces. Understanding El Salvador within this revolutionary regional
context helps highlight the leftist ideologies and support that the FMLN received from its
neighbors, especially from the FSLN. This international setting also underscores the U.S.’s direct
culpability in financing repressive and abusive military dictatorships. In more ways than one,
U.S. intervention in the region is intimately tied to the current states of these Central American
nations.

ii.

3

Civil War (1980-1992)

Liberation theology is a religious movement centered in Latin America in the late 20th century
and emphasizes the Catholic duty to aid (and ‘liberate’) poor and oppressed peoples through
civic, political, and social involvement.
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El Salvador’s civil war began in 1980 and lasted 12 brutal years, claiming the lives of
over 75,000, disappearing almost 10,000, and displacing over a million4 (Guzmán Orellana and
Mendia Azkue 2013, International Crisis Group 2017a). The FMLN’s main opposition was the
authoritarian U.S.-backed Salvadoran government, which was linked closely with extrajudicial
paramilitary groups. Massive financial support from both the Carter and Reagan U.S.
administrations provided this repressive Salvadoran military dictatorship with the necessary arms
and military training to consistently hold the upper hand over the FMLN. The political elite later
formed the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance, or ARENA), a
conservative political party founded by the leader of the death squads, Roberto D’Aubuisson
(Wood 2003).
US-backed Salvadoran state forces acted with widespread impunity during the war, and
were responsible for over 85% of the total deaths, while the FMLN was responsible for only 5%
(the other 10% of deaths were unattributable) (Betancur, Planchart et al. 1993, Wood 2008). In
its efforts to eradicate all FMLN members and supporters, state forces engaged in torture,
murder, rape, and kidnapping, against rural civilian populations, students, and religious leaders
(Musalo 2018). Sexual violence was used as a tool by soldiers to stoke fear in civilians, or to
dehumanize and punish political prisoners (Leiby 2012). In the El Mozote massacre of 1981,
state forces murdered 1,000 peasants in a rural community. Survivors recall that every girl and
woman was raped before being brutally executed (Leiby 2012). The Salvadoran military was
demonstrably willing to sexually violate and kill any woman who spoke out against the regime;

4

One fifth of the population at the time was either internally or externally displaced; that is,
over a million Salvadorans fled their homes to escape the violence and instability brought on by
the war (Menjívar and Gómez Cervantes 2018). By 1987, roughly 10% of the population was
internally displaced, 10% had fled to the United States, and 5% sought refuge in other Central
American countries or Mexico (Wood 2008).
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in 1980, four American activist churchwomen [Maryknoll nuns] were arrested, raped and
murdered by National Guard members (Betancur, Planchart et al. 1993).

iii.

Post-War
Scholars have generally separated Salvadoran history into ‘before’ and ‘after’ the civil

war, as a way to understand the social and political effects of conflict in society (Hume 2009).
For the purposes of this study, I focus almost exclusively on post-war El Salvador to better
understand the contemporary levels of violence within the country.
The civil war came to an official end in January of 1992 with the signing of the
Chapultepec Peace Accords by the two groups which established the FMLN as a legitimate
political party, and reorganized the country’s police and military forces (McNamara 2017).
However, the years since the civil war have been anything but peaceful. While the accords did
create the UN Truth Commission (which was tasked with investigating ‘serious acts of violence’
between 1980-9), the massive human rights violations that occurred during the war were not
addressed by the state due to widespread impunity, and the very perpetrators of the violence
during the war remained in power post-war (Musalo 2018, 18). Understanding El Salvador
within the context of Latin American countries that did indeed implement transnational justice
policies (including, in the case of Argentina, monetary reparations for victims, fair trials for
military juntas, and comprehensive investigations into crimes of the dictatorship) highlights the
incompetence of the Salvadoran government, and underscores the state’s indifference to
addressing the wartime traumas and bringing justice to its people.
On top of triggering economic havoc, widespread trauma, and power abuses, El
Salvador’s civil war also initiated mass emigration from the country, principally to the United
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States (Hume 2008). Economic liberalization policies in the 1980’s and 1990’s caused El
Salvador to suffer high rates of emigration; neoliberal policies contributed to an outflow of
Salvadorans seeking economic opportunity elsewhere as employment and government services at
home plummeted (Schmidt and Buechler 2017). Many of these individuals, specifically males
and fathers, left in order to find better jobs to support their families. (Schmidt and Buechler
2017). It is estimated that “more than 25 percent of the Salvadoran population fled the country
during the 1980s, and most of this migration was male” (Flores-Yeffal and Fren 2018, 133;
Gammage 2007). Due to this outflow of Salvadoran men, women and young children were left
without male ‘protection’ in an already dangerous wartime context, thus making them more
vulnerable to predatory individuals. Daughters and wives of these fatherless families are seen as
“disponibles,” or ‘available’ for exploitation, including by gang members (Schmidt and
Buechler 2017). Emigration from El Salvador led to the re-structuring of families: women were
left as heads of household, and found themselves in unstable relationships. These complex
processes and consequences of emigration create multiple levels of suffering.

iv.

Gang Formation & Proliferation
As an direct consequence of the civil war, nearly 20 percent of Salvadorans fled the

country and sought refuge in the US (mostly Los Angeles, CA) in search of safety (Moodie
2010). Rivaling and copying the formations of pre-existing gangs in Los Angeles, many recently
displaced Salvadoran youths joined street gangs as a form of protection and social bonding
(Reisman 2006, Wolf 2012). Probably the most notable examples are the now Salvadoran-based
transnational gangs (or maras, as they are known colloquially), Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), and
its rival, Barrio 18 (B-18). Despite the Reagan administration’s efforts to deport these
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Salvadoran refugees, the Salvadoran-born population in the US increased nearly fivefold from
1980 to 1990 (Terrazas 2010). Nevertheless, Bill Clinton signed the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996 which it made it much easier for the government to
deport those convicted of minor offences (shoplifting, unlawful overstaying in the U.S.)
(Terrazas 2010, International Crisis Group 2017b) Working alongside local law enforcement, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS; now known as Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, or ICE) Violent Gang Task Force formed in this same period as part of Clinton’s
effort to target and deport immigrant gang members (Chacon 2007). It is important to keep in
mind that the majority of those who joined gangs were young and did so to protect themselves
and find community. Of the 17,611 Salvadorans forcibly deported from the U.S. between 1994
and 1999, 8,414 held a ‘criminal status,’ according to the INS (Immigration and Naturalization
Service 1999). Prior to these mass deportations, Martínez (n.d.) asserts, “there were no gangs in
El Salvador. They didn’t exist. The phenomenon of the maras was exported by the United States
to Central America.”
These individuals were uprooted and dropped back into the aftermath of a civil war. The
El Salvador that they were deported to was both politically and economically unstable with a
weak justice system (Viswanathan 2018). Social exclusion, economic marginalization, the
absence of strong state institutions, and circulating firearms created an environment for gangs to
thrive. U.S. culpability for all of this cannot be ignored; the proliferation of gangs is a direct
result of the U.S.’s active role in destabilizing El Salvador during the civil war, and its
subsequent deportation of gang members back to the exact country that it destabilized.
The proliferation of gangs in El Salvador has also been in part due to the mano dura (iron
fist) policies of the 2000’s. Employed across Central America, these policies cracked down on
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gangs with military and police forces, oversaturated prisons, and effectively permitted police to
operate with total impunity (Cruz 2014). As opposed to understanding gang members as victims
of social exclusion and poverty, the state treated them as internal enemies. Police forces used
repressive tactics and targeted poor neighborhoods, imprisoning ‘perceived’ gang members with
little or no evidence (International Crisis Group 2017b, 7). The state answered violence with
violence. From 2004 to 2008, the number of imprisoned gang members doubled, and riots and
violence between members of MS-13 and B-18 intensified inside the already overwhelmed
prisons (International Crisis Group 2018). Unable to control this violence, the state began
separating gang members based on their affiliation (MS-13 or B-18). By grouping together gangs
in such a way, prisons began to operate as ‘incubators of crime,’ that is, they allowed for more
effective communication and organization between leaders and members (International Crisis
Group 2018, 13). As a direct result, gangs evolved from unorganized groups of street youth who
fought each other to defend their neighborhoods, into a much more sophisticated transnational
network (Méndez 2019, 378). This mano dura policy unintentionally strengthened gangs.
Salvadoran gang income comes from absurdly high extortion fees (known colloquially as
‘la renta’), which they force individuals (the majority of whom are not wealthy) to pay. Aptly
referred to as ‘la renta’ (rent), this extortion fee is extremely normalized in El Salvador, and
civilians pay this monthly ‘protection fee’ to gangs as if they were paying rent to their landlord
(The Economist 2016). It is estimated that Salvadorans pay between $390 and $756 million
dollars per year in extortion fees (International Crisis Group 2017, 11; Méndez 2019, 378).
Gangs torture, threaten, or even kill the children and spouses of those who do not pay “as a way
to send a message to other community members,” causing much anxiety among the already
financially-struggling population (Schmidt and Buechler 2017, 147). The gangs’ “reputation for
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violence and taste for murder” dissuades individuals from reporting this kind of abuse (Davis
2007, 47). Fear and threats of violence play a crucial role within gangs, and in their relationships
with the community—especially with women. In addition to threats and extortion, women and
other vulnerable populations bear the brunt of much gang-committed physical and psychological
violence. Although the majority of women are not members of gangs, they usually become
involved by extension of a male family member, or most commonly, a gang member who is
pursuing them. One of MS-13’s slogans, “Mata, roba, viola, controla” (“Kill, steal, rape,
control”) well-encapsulates the group’s violent ideology, and its misogynistic views (U.S.
Department of the Treasury 2012). While violence at this level is not new, Salvadoran women
suffer from multiple layers of inter-generational trauma, and gangs exacerbate existing problems.

v.

Gender Dynamics & Patriarchal Power
Not all violent men in El Salvador are gang members, but the country’s culture of violent

masculinity has indeed fueled gangs. It is important to note that this especially toxic and violent
masculinity has deep roots and fairly specific historical causes. In most cases, gang recruitment
begins between the ages of 10-14, but children as young as 8 years old work for gangs as
lookouts or extortion collectors (International Crisis Group 2017a, International Crisis Group
2018). Óscar Martínez notes that “sixty percent of Salvadoran youth live under the subjugation
of gangs” (Martínez n.d.). These recruited children are usually traumatized youth from unstable
homes who lack father figures (due to the male migration to the U.S. in the 1980’s and 90’s), or
whose father figures are already involved in a gang (Tello, Castellon et al. 2017). Both in the
U.S. and in El Salvador, gangs provided family-like structures, and also comprehensive support
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systems that the state did not provide (in the U.S. because they were undocumented and in El
Salvador because the state was poor and shattered by war). Exposed to violence at a young age,
these children grow up around gang members in an environment that encourages violent male
identities.
Understanding El Salvador’s culture of patriarchy is a crucial piece of conceptualizing the
country’s extremely high contemporary levels of female homicide (Musalo 2018, 8). Male
identities in El Salvador are constructed around violence, rooted in the “domination of women,
children and other men” (Hume 2004, 67). These identities can best be understood through
‘hegemonic masculinity,’ a term coined by Connell (1987) (Hume 2004). Hegemonic
masculinity highlights the ‘dominant form’ of masculinity that is constructed in relation to
women and ‘unfavorable’ forms of masculinity, and is upheld at all costs. In El Salvador, the use
of violence is a “legitimate element of this machista gendered identity” (Hume 2004, 67).
Feminicide and other forms of VAW are usually extensions of this violent masculinity. Feminist
theorist Hume (2009) explains that in El Salvador, “violence against women and children is
normalised and rationalised under ‘acceptable’ codes of men’s behavior” (4).
Examining El Salvador’s history of violence and brutality (and the US’s role in creating it) is
critical when discussing contemporary levels of violence, especially VAW. Salvadoran women
bear multiple levels of social, political, and economic violence; this violence is intergenerational, and current VAW levels are deeply tied with history. Before delving into my
literature review chapter, in the subsection below I briefly define terms that I employ throughout
the paper.
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Terms and Concept Definitions
Feminicide (feminicidio)
Clarifying the difference between the terms ‘feminicide’ (or ‘femicide’) and ‘female
homicide’ is key in grasping the multi-pronged forms of violence enacted on female bodies in a
global context. While the term ‘female homicide’ simply refers to the murder of a woman,
‘feminicide’ points to the underlying engendered behavior that leads to the murder. The term
‘feminicide’ (or feminicidio) first emerged in 1993 to expose “the hidden power dimension
within gender relations,” describing what was thought to be the specific phenomena of sexual
violence and homicides of women in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, but is now used globally and more
widely to describe killings of women or girls (Prieto-Carrón, Thomson et al. 2007, The Geneva
Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 2015). This term “holds responsible not only
the male perpetrators but also the state and judicial structures that normalize
misogyny…feminicide helps to disarticulate belief systems that place violence based on gender
inequality within the private sphere and reveals the very social character of the killing of women
as a product of relations of power between men and women” (Sanford 2008, 112). The
perpetrators of feminicides are almost always male—usually a friend, family member or former
or current intimate partner of the victim (Nowak 2012, 3). ‘Feminicide’ is used to highlight the
structural explanations and underlying gendered factors that must be taken into account when
examining female homicide. Because the Salvadoran state explicitly recognizes feminicidio as a
crime (as opposed to the differently-spelled term ‘femicidio,’ which other Latin American
countries recognize), I use the word ‘feminicide’ when discussing the concept.
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Intersectionality
Coined in 1989 by Kimberlé Crenshaw, intersectionality is the interconnectedness of
social categories such as race, gender, class (Crenshaw 1989). Intersectionality highlights how
these characteristics overlap and ‘intersect’ with one another, and subsequently create systems of
discrimination and disadvantage, or of privilege and power. In this paper, I employ this term to
underscore the multiple layers of historical, political, and sociological causal mechanisms that
have contributed to El Salvador’s high contemporary female homicide rate. To properly study
VAW and its deep roots in Salvadoran society, the intersections of multiple factors must be taken
into account.

Extortion
Formally, extortion is the act of obtaining something (usually money) through coercion.
In most cases, this coercion takes the form of intimidation—most often brute force or threat to a
victim’s loved one or property (Martínez n.d.). Extortion is directed at all Salvadorans (despite
their gender), but it should indeed be considered as a part of the multiple forms of violence that
women face. Although it is a financial threat, it is also backed up by the implied threat of
violence that is oftentimes taken out on women’s bodies. I use this term most often in my
discussions of the extortion fees that Salvadoran gang members intimidate individuals into
paying.

Gender Inequality
At its core, my thesis is about gender inequality. Engrained in societal norms of countries,
codified in laws, and embedded even within women themselves, gender inequality does not
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present itself in a monolithic form (Kristoff and WuDunn 2009, 66). It cuts across countries,
socio-economic classes, races, and religions, and is both an intersectional and global
phenomenon. I assert that using female homicide rates is an important way to measure gender
inequality because it exposes the ways in which societal ideas are physically manifested on the
bodies of women. By focusing on the most extreme manifestation of VAW, I am better able to
understand the value of female life across the globe, and within El Salvador specifically. It is
important to clarify that female homicide is not the only important aspect of VAW. Women’s
equality and autonomies are stifled by rampant sexual, domestic, and structural violence, as well
as the threats of such violence. However, I choose to focus on female homicide because it is the
most ‘measurable’ and includes the most reliable and widely available data.
While some scholars focus intensely on the violations of personal and physical liberties
that women experience (Kristoff and WuDunn 2009), others turn to women’s representation in
the political sphere to measure and explain their status in society (Paxton, Hughes, and Barnes
2021). I believe that when discussing gender inequality, we should value both explanations.
Taking this into account, I define gender inequality as the following: the unequal or subordinate
status of women to their male counterparts, and any barrier—physical or political—that they face
in life related to their gender. It is imperative that we eradicate the more concrete aspects of
gender inequality as displayed through violence, but this seems to only be possible when women
are present in positions of political power. For this reason, a global and intersectional approach is
taken in order to understand and measure gender inequality. These definitions directly relate to
my chapter on global female homicide rates, and my qualitative case study of El Salvador.

Weak State
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Also referred to as a ‘fragile state,’ this term came into discussion post-2001 (after 9/11),
and has since been used to describe nations that have difficulty fulfilling basic tasks (making and
enforcing laws, providing public services, managing the economy, etc). Weak states provide
inadequate political goods to their citizens; these nations generally are unsafe, lack governmental
transparency, and have little respect for human rights. Thus, weak states are often susceptible to
organized crime, violence, and civil war. I employ this term specifically in my case study chapter
in relation to the Salvadoran state.
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III.

Literature Review
Due to the alarmingly high rate of violence that women in El Salvador experience, there is

a variety of research from a wide range of disciplines that explores the emergence of VAW.
VAW must be understood within an intersectional context due to its complex nature. For this
reason, I engage with a variety of disciplines, including: history, economics, political science,
feminist theory, and sociology. Understanding the unprecedented levels of violence requires
analyzing the past trauma Salvadorans have collectively experienced through multiple lenses.
This literature review relies on VAW research conducted both globally, and directly in El
Salvador. Previous research reveals three hypothetical causal factors of VAW and female
homicide: the civil war, organized crime, and resource access. In this chapter, I discuss these
three plausible explanations for VAW in depth, and comment on their relevance to my study of
El Salvador’s contemporary female homicide rate.

i.

Civil War
In order to better grasp questions such as: ‘what explains the skyrocketing levels of female

homicide?’ it is imperative to take into account El Salvador’s history—including its experiences
with authoritarianism, civil war, and state-sanctioned violence.
History serves as a key lens to examine this violence; El Salvador’s transformations during
the civil war have reconfigured social processes and left enduring legacies on social networks
(Wood 2008). I argue that more specifically that these ‘social processes’ can be examined
through the transformation of gender roles during and post-war. Moser (2001) advances this
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argument by exploring the treatment of men and women as ‘separate actors’ postwar. In viewing
men and women in such a binary, the material needs of women—land distribution, capital, and
healthcare—were disregarded and ignored by the state. This gendered peace process cemented
women’s subordinate status in Salvadoran society. Women were additionally forced to take on
new roles post war as single impoverished heads of household, thus leading to more vulnerability
in a deeply patriarchal post-war society. Despite the fact that female combatants in the civil war
made up ~30% of the insurgency, they received neither reparations nor rehabilitation after the
war (Wood 2008). Cockburn (1999) contends that “society rebuilt after war or tyranny seldom
reflects women’s visions or rewards their energies” (Cockburn 1999, 17). Sexism is pervasive in
Salvadoran society, thus requiring a structural change to eradicate its rigid system. In their paper
on preventing VAW, Fulu and Heise (2015) suggest that “strictly enforced gender roles” in
fundamentally patriarchal societies allow for environments conducive to intimate partner
violence (IPV) (14). This logic of strict divisions between sexes leading to higher IPV rates can
be applied to El Salvador and is helpful in understanding why VAW and female homicide have
been recently recorded at shockingly high levels. While gendered divisions of labor were very
much present pre-war, scholars contend that the civil war cemented and further solidified the
patriarchal societal structure of El Salvador. These theories offer insight into how gender
inequalities in El Salvador have deepened as result of the civil war, which did not address
women’s needs.
Despite the peace accords, the years since the civil war have seen a skyrocketing in
violence, with homicide rates ranking highest in the world in the years of 2009, and 2015-2018,
leading some scholars to call it ‘a peace worse than war’ (Musalo 2018) (World Bank 2009,
2015, 2016, 2017, 2018). El Salvador’s bloody and unequal past has had long-lasting effects on
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its society. Chávez argues that El Salvador’s history—specifically the civil war—has created
intense, widespread trauma and ‘psychosocial consequences’ among the population and has led
to increases in domestic violence among the postwar generation and been met with equally
violent responses from gangs and the state (Chávez 2004, MJSP 2019). The state has answered
the public with violence, and taught society to resolve their problems—personal, political,
communal, or social— with violence (Chávez 2004). Chavez’s findings offer insight into the
‘culture of violence’ that was solidified during the civil war, arguing that its main features
include “the use of terror and terrorism as a method for dealing with social conflict, the lack of
value and respect for human life, and the proliferation and use of firearms” (Chávez 2004, 33).
Using the civil war as a framework, we can better grasp how the devaluation of human life and
use of violence to mediate conflict may be contributing to the high female homicide rate in
Salvadoran society today.
The postwar period also brought an influx of firearms into circulation, creating what
some scholars refer to as a ‘culture of arms’ (Chávez 2004, Vaquerano 2016). An unaccounted
number of guns were left in circulation among ex-combatants and the general population.
Firearms are used in homicides in Latin America more than anywhere else in the world, and are
linked tightly to gender-motivated killings and other inequalities (UNODC 2019). Government
and non-partisan reports have revealed that the majority of gender-based homicides in El
Salvador are carried through with a firearm (MJSP 2019, Vaquerano 2016).
Fitzsimmons (1998) reveals that the civil war, and a high number of unemployed male
guerillas or military soldiers may also play a role in the increase of VAW in El Salvador. She
asserts that post-civil war situations frequently leave women highly vulnerable to domestic abuse
from their partner; even in peace-time, women are not safe. Already accustomed to violence,

Hull 23
these demobilized male combatants return home from war, and take out their economic
frustration and assert their authority through violence (Fitzsimmons 1998, 270). Viterna (2014)
contends that this ‘patriarchal backlash’ should be considered central to the de-mobilization
processes. This plays out clearly in a post-war society such as El Salvador. Many Salvadoran
men experienced what scholars call a ‘crisis of masculinity,’ which occurs when men retire their
“hyper-masculinized violent roles” within a post-war context (Viterna 2014, 197). Their return
home often after fighting in the war leads to surges in domestic violence (Viterna 2014). The
combination of women’s newfound autonomy during their partners absence, coupled with their
recently deployed husband’s firearm access, PTSD, and training to respond to all problems with
violence proves to be lethal towards women.
A cross-national analysis of World Health Organization data from 1999 finds that women
are among the most affected long-term victims of civil war violence, and that civil wars may lead
to increases in homicide rates “through the breakdown of norms and practices of social order”
(Ghobarah, Huth, et al. 2003, 200). Gartner and Kennedy (2018) also found that post-war periods
can often lead to increased rates of homicide, including female homicide. Furthermore, sexual
violence towards women increases post-war, and the participation in the labor force and general
autonomy that women enjoyed during the war is met with violent responses post-war from men
(most often their husbands who feel threatened by their gains) (Gartner and Kennedy 2018).
Post-conflict, political violence is converted into interpersonal violence (Boutron 2015, Gartner
and Kennedy 2018).
Civil war may indeed lead to postwar increases in both female and male homicide. In
their empirical study (110 countries surveyed) on the causes of postwar homicides between 1900
and 1970, Archer and Gartner (1976) found that homicides in postwar nations could largely be
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attributed to the ‘legitimation of violence’ that occurs during war. In wartime, “society reverses
its customary prohibitions against killing and instead honors acts of violence which would be
regarded as murderous during peacetime” (943). Wars legitimate homicidal violence; the
officially approved violence during wartime leaves residual effects on homicides even in
peacetime.
Scholars contend that El Salvador’s civil war has left long-lasting scars on post-war
society. The aforementioned theories offer insight into the how country’s civil war reconfigured
the structures of social networks, cemented already-present gender hierarchies, and legitimized
violence in day-to-day life. I posit that these processes have had increasingly violent effects on
society because of easy access to firearms for both the general population and ex-combatants.
The civil war taught Salvadoran society that violence was a legitimate response to adversity, and
provided men with the tools to enact it in their personal spheres (in the home), and in public
spaces. I hypothesize that this access to violent weapons, coupled with unemployment for male
soldiers and their frustrations with women’s resource gains during the war may have led to
violent gendered backlashes against women.

ii.

Gangs & Organized Crime
In an already male-dominated country such as El Salvador, gang culture and organized

crime may also be part of the problem. Because men and boys are often centered in
conversations about gangs in Latin America, there is less research that focuses solely on the
violent complexities of women’s relationships to gangs. Centering women in discussions about
organized crime is crucial to humanize their experiences, and uncovering gang’s attitudes
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towards female subjects serves as an important link to its potential role as a causal factor in the
high contemporary female homicide rate in El Salvador.
While research that associates male gang membership directly with female homicide rates
is scarce, Washington Valdez (2006) is one of few who directly accuse drug gangs of killing
women. In Valdez’s work, ‘Harvest of Women,’ she attributes the shockingly high rate of
femicidios in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, as part of initiation rituals for gangs and drug traffickers.
Some research has also been conducted that links other forms of VAW with gang members.
Previous research by Jewkes et al. (2013) finds that men who are also members of gangs or
organized crime groups are more likely to commit acts of sexual violence. In this cross-national
study, gang membership was associated with non-partner multiple perpetrator rape, thus
reflecting the pervasive ideas of aggression and dominance over women that gang membership
may breed (Fulu and Heise 2015). Although this study restricts its discussion to sexual violence,
I hypothesize that the same principles can be applied to female homicide, which is the most
lethal form of VAW.
The proliferation of organized crime has exacerbated the already underlying patriarchal
norms that exist in the society. Gangs’ “access to deadly weapons,” coupled with views that
“women and girls are considered to be the property of gangs” makes for a lethal combination
(Musalo 2018). Interviews in El Salvador conducted by Hume (2007) bring a feminist
perspective to research on gang violence, illuminating the gendered tensions between women in
society and male gang members. Her findings reveal that women’s fear of conflict with gang
members stems especially from the consequences of violence or death they may face if they
refuse gang members’ sexual advances (Hume 2007, Grillo 2017). Salvadoran gang members
employ gender-based sexual violence or threats as tactics to command power and instill fear in
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women and girls (Winton 2005). Understanding the actors, as well as the multiple forms of
intimidation, abuse, and violence that gang members commit is a crucial piece in potentially
explaining the heightened rate of female homicide in El Salvador. VAW is not new to El
Salvador, however, literature suggests that the increased presence of gangs in the past decades
may have exacerbated the pre-existing problems of patriarchal power, potentially leading to
rising female homicide rates.
Discussions regarding the effects of gang activity in El Salvador are mixed; some authors
see gang members as powerful transnational and violent actors, while others argue that gang
members’ violent influences have been overstated. Pérez (2013) points to gang activity as one of
Central America’s most pressing problems. Salvadoran gangs have occupied an international
spotlight in media reports, being branded by some as ‘a new urban insurgency’ (Jütersonke,
Muggah et al. 2009). I hypothesize that organized crime proliferation and the high rates of maleon-male violence may have distracted the state from adequately addressing the gang’s violence
toward women in El Salvador, allowing for it to become permissible and perhaps normalized.
However, I also recognize that the relationship between gangs and the state is one of many
complexities. Some scholars claim that the lines between political violence and criminal violence
in Latin America have become blurred, and that organized crime’s prevalence is linked with the
role of the state (Vogt 2013). While I am cautious to place blame on “the radicalized bodies of
marginalized young men,” I argue that it is important to recognize that elected officials have
collaborated with organized crime groups, thus highlighting the pervasive nature of gangs in
political spheres (Wolf 2012, 212). Partnering with the state legitimizes their power, allowing for
higher rates of impunity. I posit that this collusion may contribute to heightened rates of violent
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acts against women, the perpetrators of which abuse women under the assumption they will not
be prosecuted.
Other research contends that the role of gangs is often exaggerated by the media and the
state, and claims that organized crime groups cannot be the scapegoats for all female homicides.
Moodie (2010) warns of the dangers of giving too much criminal agency to gang members. She
argues that by linking delinquent behavior to problems of individual deviance, the state
diminishes its culpable role and neglects its responsibilities to address the structure inequalities
that have allowed for rampant gang violence and gender inequality (Moodie 2010). While the
evidence is clearly varied on the role of gangs, scholars do agree that gang violence, gender
inequalities, and homicide are reflections of El Salvador’s highly divided society, and its
unaddressed civil war traumas.
I assert that the violent nature of gangs and their potential actors as causal factors of
female homicide in El Salvador cannot be ignored. However, my hypotheses are manifold, and
do not point to gang proliferation as the sole causal factor of VAW. My study highlights the
intersectional aspects and complex layers of causal factors that may have contributed to recently
heightened levels of female homicide, with gangs being one of them.

iii.

Women’s Resources
Understanding the role of resource access and female empowerment could help explain

the recent peak in female homicide rates in El Salvador. While traditional feminist theory has
argued that women’s increased access to employment, income, and education could theoretically
reduce VAW and increase gender equality, more recent studies assert that this relationship is far
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more complex, involving periods of both heightened and decreased violence during the resource
attainment process. Russell (1975), an early feminist thinker who sought a relationship between
sexual violence towards women and resource security, proposed the ‘backlash hypothesis,’ in
which she argued that VAW increased in reaction to the improvement of female socioeconomic
status and power (Russell 1975). Building on Russell’s ‘backlash hypothesis,’ Fulu and Heise
(2015) similarly propose a non-linear relationship between the level of a woman's education and
her risk of violence from an intimate partner. (Fulu and Heise 2015).
Jewkes (2002) asserts that this link between VAW and female education, and therefore
‘liberality’ of their ideas (increased autonomy), can best be described as an inverted-U shape,
where low levels of education empowers women to defy some traditional sex roles, but
“empowerment carries an increased risk of violence until a high enough level is reached for
protective effects to predominate” (Jewkes 2002, 1425). While both Russell and Jewkes agree
that partners inflict violence to reassert their dominant role in the relationship and suppress the
woman’s newly-found power, Jewkes takes Russell’s theory of ‘violence backlash’ a step further
by claiming the association between female autonomy and violence is non-monotonic (Cools and
Kotsadam 2017). Put more simply, Jewkes’ theory explains that during periods in which women
become more resourceful, they are met with higher risks of abuse until an apex point is reached
and then violence begins to decrease as women gain access to enough resources to leave the
home or access institutions/communities that help them escape this violence. This theory is
demonstrated visually in Figure 2 below. Findings from a cross-national study on economic
empowerment and IPV in low and middle-income countries suggest that these ‘protective
effects’ may take action when women have access to secondary school or higher (Vyas and
Watts 2009). Solotaroff and Pande (2014) have additionally examined the idea of VAW reaching
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a ‘tipping point, where social norms around gender violence are profoundly altered, or lead to the
creations of new laws (Solotaroff and Pande 2014). Jewkes’s notion of ‘liberality’ can be applied
in a broader context to women’s empowerment and autonomy in Salvadoran society. Although
these studies restrict their discussions to intimate partner violence (IPV), I argue that the same
principles can be applied to female homicide, which is the most lethal form of VAW, and often
is a result of recurrent IPV.
Figure 2. Inverted-U Theory: Female Resource Attainment and Violence against Women
High
Violence

Low
Violence

Few
Resources

Many
Resources

Jewkes’s inverted-U theory is key in understanding access to resources as a hypothetical
causal factor of VAW and female homicide. These resource theories provide a global conceptual
framework through which we must understand female homicide; however, they must be
contextualized. While the above-mentioned frameworks have only been applied cross-nationally
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or outside of Latin America, my examination of El Salvador situates these theories in one
specific context. I argue that in order to deeply understand how this inverted-U theory manifests
itself, it must be investigated within a country with a human-centered approach. These studies
are key to understanding the recent spike in female homicides in El Salvador. I hypothesize that
the country is slowly reaching its apex or peak of heightened violence backlash from men,
potentially contributing to its heightened female homicide rate in recent years.

Autonomous Women’s Groups
Cross-national research has consistently highlighted the key role of autonomous women’s
groups as key in pushing through VAW laws and reinforcing institutions that promote women’s
status in society (Weldon 2002, Weldon 2011, Htun and Weldon 2012). According to Weldon
(2002) government responsiveness to VAW is most often determined by the presence of
powerful, autonomous women’s groups (5). Countries with weak women’s organizations tend to
not have strong VAW legislation. When they are strong, these groups have the capacity to
comprehensively influence decisions made by public institutions regarding VAW.
While many feminist thinkers have historically grouped ‘women’ into a monolithic group
that shares interests, Weldon (2011) underscores the importance of focusing on women as a
diverse group that has the power to work collectively to enact social change. Social structures
define women as a social collectivity, and external processes link members of women’s
movements into a ‘series,’ within which each woman brings her own social perspective (Weldon
2011). Weldon argues that women should put aside what may divide them (race, religion, and
socio-economic status) and find solidarity by focusing on what links them together: being
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women in a male-dominated society. “When women organize as women,” their efforts may be
made more visible (Weldon 2011, 444) Understanding El Salvador through this lens may provide
a new approach to potentially more effective political mobilization and representation for women
fighting to mitigate female homicide levels and VAW. Through a process of unity in their
commitment to combating VAW and female homicide, women across El Salvador could work
collectively with a shared commitment to gender justice and female empowerment.
Mala Htun and Laurel Weldon, both key political scientists writing about violence
against women internationally, offer critical links to its relation to public policy. They present a
global comparative analysis of national policies on violence against women from 1975-2005
(Htun and Weldon 2012). Although this study does indeed comprehensively analyze the
institutions in place to address VAW across countries and creates a metric to measure
government responses to VAW, I argue that the study does not necessarily take into account the
proper implementation or effectiveness of these institutions. In the case of El Salvador, the state
has implemented special institutions, laws, and is in many ways at the forefront of Latin
American laws against VAW, yet still experiences extremely high rates of female homicide. My
study takes a more holistic approach, assessing women’s accessibility and use of institutions in
place, taking into account the high impunity rates for VAW crimes, institutional corruption, and
low levels of VAW reporting. Furthermore, Htun and Weldon’s findings present that the
mobilization of non-governmental feminist groups is a key in achieving policy change (Htun and
Weldon 2012). While their study focuses broadly over four decades on global policies (they
exclude El Salvador from their study), I hone in on both the governmental policies to mitigate
VAW and the strength of women’s groups within one country, creating a much more detailed
and complete analysis. Htun and Weldon’s (2012) research provides a global frame for my study
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of women’s movements within El Salvador, and the extent to which feminist civil society
organizations in El Salvador are able to pressure the government to take better measures to
combat and monitor VAW. The presence of autonomous women’s organizations in El Salvador
may be the key to pushing down VAW levels.
Previous research reveals that the civil war, organized crime, and women’s access to
resources (women’s organizations and education), are three hypothetical causal factors of VAW
and female homicide. While plenty of this literature discusses VAW and its root causes in a
cross-national context, very little research does so in a holistic, intersectional way. By focusing
solely on contemporary El Salvador, and engaging with theories across the disciplines, my thesis
aims to bridge this aforementioned gap. Similarly, a great deal of literature exists which
discusses the critical role that women’s movements play in influencing VAW legislation.
However, of the aforementioned research, little has been conducted within Central America, and
much less has been conducted solely in El Salvador. This thesis provides a comprehensive
overview of previously unexplored Salvadoran women’s groups, and sheds light on their vital
role of promoting gender justice within contemporary El Salvador.
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IV.

Hypotheses
As highlighted in my literature review, scholars generally contend that civil war, gangs,

and women’s resources may be contributing factors to female homicide. In this brief section, I
outline the four hypotheses that I test in my study.
Building on work presented by civil war scholars, I hypothesize that El Salvador’s brutal
civil war contributed to the legitimation of violence and devaluation of human life, and cemented
pre-existing gender inequalities.
While literature regarding gang members is indeed mixed, I posit that their presence in El
Salvador cannot be ignored as a potential causal factor of female homicide.
Women’s resource access has been highlighted by many prominent scholars as an
important potential explanation for female homicide rate increase. I suggest that women’s
resources can be thought about as education or as women’s organizing.
In conversation with Jewkes (2002), Vyas and Watts (2009), and Solotaroff (2014), I
hypothesize that when women have very low levels of education, they will experience moderate
levels of female homicide, and as female education attainment increases, so will female
homicide rate; however, as the percent of women who have completed secondary school nears
100% there will be lower female homicide rates.
As Weldon (2002), Weldon (2011) and Htun and Weldon (2012) highlight, autonomous
women’s groups are a critical piece of mitigating VAW rates, and achieving policy changes to
promote women’s safety, thus, I hypothesize that the lack of strong women’s organizations is
contributing to the country’s increased female homicide rate.
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Though only briefly touched on in my background chapter and literature review, I believe
that El Salvador’s high female homicide rate cannot be fully explained without taking into
account the role of the Salvadoran government. Engaging with the state as a potential causal
mechanism provides a more holistic analysis of the actors that may be contributing to these
shocking female homicide levels within El Salvador.
Based on the aforementioned literature, I have developed four plausible hypotheses to
answer my research question ‘what explains contemporary El Salvador’s extraordinarily high
female homicide rate?’ My hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1. Long term effects of El Salvador’s civil war have led to heightened rates of
female homicide in the country.
Hypothesis 2. Increased gang membership and gang violence has led to high female
homicide rates in El Salvador.
Hypothesis 3. The lack of available women’s resources has led to heightened female
homicide rates in El Salvador.
Hypothesis 4. The Salvadoran state is not confidently addressing the country’s high
female homicide rate.
In the following section, I discuss the methodology that I employ to test these four hypotheses.
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V.

Methodology
A variety of methods are implemented in order to examine the high levels of VAW in El

Salvador in recent years. I use a mixed-method and three-pronged approach, including time
series and cross-national statistical analysis, intensive qualitative case study, and close-analysis
of Salvadoran VAW legislation.
I employ time-series analysis to test my hypotheses about resource access and gangs’
potential influence on female homicide rates. To do this, I statistically evaluate VAW levels in
comparison with indicators of female secondary school enrollment, and organized crime
proliferation, in order to assess the effects of resource access and gang violence on female
homicide rate. These statistics are collected from the World Bank Databank, as well as from
publications by the government of El Salvador.
Through cross-national statistical analysis, I test my hypotheses about the civil war, gang
activity, and women’s resources. In this chapter, I compare female homicide rates across
countries, looking specifically at factors such as civil war, organized crime, and female
secondary school educational attainment. Finally, I examine the continent of Latin America, the
region of Central America, and then El Salvador specifically, seeking to understand how El
Salvador’s gender violence statistics fit in with its neighbors, as well as on a global scale.
Within the intensive qualitative case study chapter, I test my hypothesis about the
Salvadoran civil war contributing to the country’s female homicide rate by closely examining
VAW rates and consulting with both non-governmental, and governmental reports from El
Salvador. Exploring El Salvador’s history provides useful information on perspectives around
VAW and its persistence within the country. In this chapter, I interact with El Salvador’s
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criminal code and legislations regarding VAW to explore how these laws reflected social ideas at
the time, and what was acceptable about VAW.
I engage with the following laws that specifically address domestic violence and female
homicide:
i.

Ley Contra la Violence Intrafamiliar (LVI, Law against Domestic Violence), 1996

ii.

Penal Code article 200, 1998

iii.

Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicación de la Discriminación contra las Mujeres
(LIE, Law of Equality, Equity, and Eradication of Discrimination against Women),
2012

iv.

Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para la Mujeres (LEIV, Law
for a Life Free of Violence against Women), 2012
I note that the establishment of these laws does not necessarily ensure their enforcement,

but rather provides insight into how laws embody a general acceptance of what was considered
permissible behavior by the government. I test my hypothesis about the Salvadoran
government’s inability to address female homicide rates by investigating El Salvador’s local
statistics regarding gender violence, relying on interviews with prominent activists and officials,
analyzing human rights reports from international organizations, and consulting with
government-issued documents.
My research is further guided by data from women’s rights organizations such as the
Salvadoran Organization of Women for Peace (ORMUSA, a non-partisan group that conducts
their own investigations into violence towards women), and the Salvadoran Institute for
Women’s Development (ISDEMU, a governmental mechanism that monitors and advocates for
VAW legislation). I also rely on interviews with prominent Salvadoran female activists and
legislators. Here, I test my hypothesis about women’s organizing by gaging the ability of
women’s groups to pressure the Salvadoran government and push through VAW laws.
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VI.

Examining Female Homicide Rate within a Global
Context
Before providing an in-depth discussion of VAW within El Salvador, I first provide

global context by analyzing female homicide rates in the world. This offers a better
understanding of how El Salvador fits into the global frame, and, more broadly, what factors may
contribute to heightened female homicide rates cross-nationally. This empirical chapter includes
three sections. I begin by explaining the female homicide data that I use, and provide visuals
(Figures 3, 4, 5) to conceptualize how drastically female homicide rates vary across countries.
Next, I lay out three hypotheses which I developed to answer my research question: ‘why does
female homicide rate vary across countries?’ Finally, I discuss my findings (Figures 6, 7, 8), and
highlight some of the trends and factors that appear to matter cross-nationally.

i.

Visualizing cross-national female homicide rates
VAW is intersectional; it varies and manifests itself in different forms across classes,

races, and countries. I recognize that using female homicide as a measure may not function to
accurately gage all complexities of VAW on a global scale. However, I argue that one way to
grasp gender inequality is by investigating the basic levels of personal autonomy that women
possess across countries. Focusing on female homicide rates not only measures society’s value of
female life, but also gages women’s physical autonomy. By comparing this rate cross-nationally,
I am able establish trends across regions, and offer explanations as to why these rates vary so
significantly across the world. While different countries may report varying degrees of violence
due to factors such as social norms, the capacity of institutions to measure and report on this, and
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class differences, VAW is present in some shape in every country—no country is exempt
from it. I examine these ‘cultures of brutality’ through a global lens in order to contextualize
where El Salvador fits in (Kristoff and WuDunn 2009, 85).
I engage with data from the World Bank DataBank. More specifically, I examine the
series ‘intentional homicides, female (per 100,000 female)’, which is defined as the following:
‘Intentional homicides, female’ are estimates of unlawful female homicides
purposely inflicted as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence,
violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and
predatory violence and killing by armed groups. Intentional homicide does not
include all intentional killing; the difference is usually in the organization of the
killing. Individuals or small groups usually commit homicide, whereas killing in
armed conflict is usually committed by fairly cohesive groups of up to several
hundred members and is thus usually excluded.
The World Bank DataBank sources their data and definition of female homicide rate
from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's (UNODC) International Homicide Statistics database.
This rate is calculated by applying the sex ratio of reported victims to the total number of
intentional homicide victims. The World Bank reports that this existing data on female homicide
rate is collected from two main sources: public health systems, and criminal justice authorities.
Public health data is obtained from databases published by the World Health Organization
(WHO), and criminal justice data is derived from national government sources, as well as
international agencies such as Interpol, Eurostat, OAS, and UNICEF.
The World Bank does acknowledge the challenges in ensuring accurate measurement of
the data, especially due to the fact that the authorities of each country are tasked with reporting
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these statistics. These statistics are not only a reflection of the country’s levels of extreme VAW,
but also a measure of the capacity of their legal systems to accurately measure and report such
data. In this study, I consult global 10-year averages from 2008-2018 to measure these rates over
time. A larger sample size helps maintain accuracy and better reflects long-term trends in the
data. Depending on data size, I also consult with 2016 (most recent) data when available.
Visualizing female homicide rates across the globe is key in understanding how this
violence manifests itself at different levels in different countries. As seen in Figure 3, the 10-year
average rates of female homicide fluctuate greatly across the world. While many countries have
not reported data for this series, the 133 countries that did indeed disclose their female homicide
rate provide sufficient information to establish patterns cross-nationally.

Figure 3. Intentional Female Homicides (per 100,000), Global 10-year Average 2008-2018

El Salvador

Source: World Bank (2008-2018)
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To more deeply examine and interact with the given data, I now turn to Figure 4, where
intentional female homicide rates cross-nationally can be better examined empirically. The more
explicit presentation of the data in Figure 4 clearly illuminates trends across countries and
regions. As presented, four of the total seven Central American countries are in the top-10
countries with the highest female homicide rates, and eight of these top-10 countries are in Latin
America or the Caribbean.
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Figure 4. Intentional Female Homicides (per 100,000), Global 10-year Average 2008-2018

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

World Bank (2008-2018)

Hull 42
In order to comment on these values more specifically, I will now examine Figure 5, which
analyzes the rate cross-nationally, using a sample of countries from across the globe. Figure 5
clearly demonstrates that the female homicide rate of El Salvador is shockingly high—it is 6.5x
that of the U.S.A, and nearly 20x that of the U.K.
Figure 5. Intentional Female Homicides (per 100,000), Global 10-year Average 2008-2018

World Bank (2008-2018)

Figure 5 offers a close comparison of the U.K., the U.S.A., Mexico, and El Salvador,
highlighting El Salvador’s high rate of female homicide. While Mexico ranks high in female
homicide rate among all other countries from around the world, El Salvador experiences an
exponentially higher rate. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Europe, and Sub-Saharan
African countries report female homicide rates below 1 per 100,000 women, and this number
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rises slightly in South and Southeast Asian countries. The U.S.A. has a rate more than double
that of Sub-Saharan African and Eastern European countries.
It is clear that VAW, and more specifically, female homicide, is prevalent in all societies,
and can be understood cross-nationally. Countries may report varying degrees of violence due to
social norms and the capacity of institutions to measure and report on this; however, no country
is exempt from female homicide. But what causes female homicide rate to vary across countries?
In the following sections, I discuss and test my hypotheses.

ii.

Hypotheses
At its base, the study of VAW is inter-disciplinary; economists, political scientists,

historians, and sociologists all bring key contributions to the field. For this reason, this chapter
takes a cross-curricular and cross-national approach to hypothesize why female homicide rates
vary across the globe.
As my literature review indicates, scholars contend that civil war, gangs, and women’s
resources seem to be the most important explanations for heightened female homicide rates.
Thus, I hypothesize that civil war, organized crime, and resource access (as measured by female
education attainment) may explain why female homicide rates vary so drastically across
countries. In the following section, I test these hypotheses cross-nationally, and present my
findings (Figures 6, 7, 8).

iii.

Findings and Discussion
To answer my research question, I engaged with data from the World Bank DataBank

and the Correlates of War Project to test my hypotheses. I now discuss my findings.
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As reflected in Figure 6, data on civil war presence was retrieved from the Correlates of
War (COW) Project database, which collects and disseminates reliable quantitative data on
international relations. More specifically, these data are part of the Intra-state war data collection
which examines civil, regional, and inter-communal wars from 1816-2014. For the purposes of
my study, I exclusively examine countries that experienced civil wars since 1990 (including civil
wars that ended in 1990), in order to more closely analyze civil war’s effect on the contemporary
female homicide rates. Correspondingly, I also used 10-year average female homicide data from
2008-18, provided by the World Bank DataBank to provide a larger sample of countries.
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Figure 6 indicates a notable difference in the average mean of female homicide rates
between countries that have experienced civil war since 1990, and countries that have not. The
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average mean of the female homicide rate in countries that have experienced a civil war ending
after 1990 is 3.53, while the average mean for countries that have not experienced a civil war
since 1990 is 2.04. This rate of 2.04 is significantly lower than 3.53 (roughly 1.73 times larger),
thus suggesting that civil war indeed may play a factor in influencing female homicide rate in
post-war scenarios, which supports Hypothesis 1. With a p-value of 0.041, the probability that
the aforementioned results in Figure 6 occurred by chance is very low. In other words, we have
96% confidence that a relationship exists between post-civil war countries, and countries with
high female homicide rates. While my hypothesis may be supported by this data, it appears as
though further examination into other factors influencing female homicide rate is needed in order
to more comprehensively understand why female homicide rates vary globally.
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Organized crime data in Figure 7 was collected by the 2017-2018 World Economic
Forum Executive Opinion Survey, which asked the question ‘In your country, to what extent
does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses?’ and
ranked organized crime presence 1 to 7 (1 = imposes huge costs; 7 = imposes no costs) (World
Economic Forum 2018). Female homicide data is from 2016 and was provided by the World
Bank DataBank.
Figure 7 reflects a strong and negative relationship between organized crime and the
female homicide rate in a country, with a strong correlation coefficient of -.68. In other words,
high female homicide rates are strongly correlated with organized crime presence. The slope of
the regression line is very steep, and the R2 value is 47%, meaning that almost half of the
variation in female homicide rates is determined by organized crime presence.
Central America—specifically Honduras and El Salvador—and the Caribbean (in this
case, Jamaica) are both regions that suffer from high male and female homicide rates, in part due
to organized crime prevalence. Countries with high gun violence levels, coupled with rampant
organized crime activity oftentimes report high homicide rates. Sixty percent of female
homicides are carried through with firearms, which are also closely linked to organized crime
and gang use (The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 2011). Nowak
(2012) reports that countries that experience high levels of lethal violence and homicide also
report higher frequencies of attacks against women in public spheres, usually by gangs or
organized crime groups. Furthermore, the ‘culture of impunity’ that gangs cultivate, and the
indifference or inability for adequate government responses to VAW also permits high female
homicides to persist without punishment (Nowak 2012, 3).
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Nowak’s (2012) theories may explain why the Caribbean and Central America are
incredibly high outliers; they are marked with high levels of organized crime and gang activity,
as well as female homicide rates. Italy and Bulgaria, on the other hand, both report moderate
levels of organized crime and mafia activity, yet record very low female homicide rates. A study
conducted by the Center for the Study of Democracy notes that Bulgarian organized crime
groups seek to “keep up appearances of law-abiding conduct,” and only resort to violent methods
such as contract murders, when absolutely necessary, and usually are aimed at other male mafia
subjects (Center for the Study of Democracy 2007, 34). Similarly, organized crime in Italy
appears to be sophisticated, and exist in a more private realm, thus, women in public spheres in
Italy generally are not indirectly affected by violence from gangs like they are in the Americas.
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Educational attainment data from Figure 8 was collected from the World Bank DataBank,
which sources from the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. More specifically, this 2016 data
measures the percentage of the female population ages 25 and over that have attained or
completed lower secondary education.
Figure 8 indicates a negative relationship between female homicide and female
educational attainment, as predicted in my hypothesis. This graph demonstrates that higher
female homicide rates are generally correlated with lower female educational attainment levels,
while countries with higher female educational attainment tend to have lower female homicide
rates. These data support my hypothesis that as the percentage of women who have completed
secondary school nears 100% there will be lower female homicide rates. However, this graph
does not exactly show the inverted-U relationship between female homicide rate and female
education attainment that I expected; rather, it appears to be strongly negatively correlated, with
a correlation coefficient of -.57. In this case, roughly 33% of the variance in female homicide
rate is explained by female educational attainment, signifying a moderate relationship. The lack
of the inverted-U relationship seen in this graph may be in part due to the limitations of a small
data set, and may also be due to outlying residuals having strong influences on the trend-line
placement. Although we do not see this inverted-U relationship between female homicide and
female educational attainment cross-nationally as I had expected, perhaps examining one country
closely over a long period of time would reveal the inverted-U shape. In my case study chapter, I
test this theory through time-series statistical analysis to see if the inverted-U shape manifests
itself within El Salvador.
El Salvador and Honduras both stand out with extremely high levels of female homicide
and shockingly low levels of female educational attainment, with 40% or less of the females in
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both countries having completed lower secondary school. In the case of El Salvador, this is likely
a result of civil war affecting education rates; a large portion of women over 25 were not able to
complete secondary school or attend due to the 12-year civil war and intense violence. Historical
legacies in Baltic states (specifically Lithuania and Latvia in this case), and Eastern Europe’s
history as a post-communist region may have had indirect effects on female homicide rates.
More specifically, social changes and shifting gender roles in post-communist states produced
cultural backlashes and increased strains on family and gendered dynamics (Stamatel 2014). The
Baltic regions’ communist past also explains the persisting high levels of education in the female
population. These phenomena would explain Lithuania and Latvia’s high levels of female
education attainment, and higher levels of female homicide compared to other countries with
high percentages of female educational attainment. Similarly, Venezuela’s socialist government
and its high levels of political and social violence (against both men and women) may explain its
status as an outlier with its moderate levels of education, but still moderate female homicide rate.
My hypothesis that countries where women have very low levels of education will experience
moderate levels of female homicide, and as female education attainment increases, so will
female homicide rate, until an ‘apex point’ is reached and the protective effects of education take
hold, thus leading to decreases in female homicide rates is not supported by Figure 8. However,
the data does reflect the negative relationship between female homicide and female educational
attainment.
While my hypothesis that female education attainment would form an inverted-U shape
when graphed against female homicide rates do not appear to be supported by the available data,
my hypotheses regarding civil war and organized crime’s relation to female homicide are
strongly supported.
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This contextual chapter provides a global lens through which we can examine female
homicide rates. Furthermore, situating El Salvador in a global context further highlights its
shockingly high rates of female homicide as compared to the rest of the world. By understanding
the roles that civil war, organized crime, and women’s resources play in influencing female
homicide levels cross-nationally, I can more aptly examine how these factors influence El
Salvador specifically.
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VII.

Case Study
While El Salvador experiences the highest female homicide rate in the world, data

collected by the Demographic and Health Surveys Program5 suggests that women in El Salvador
actually have very low tolerances for VAW, especially DV and IPV (World Bank 2008-2018).
As seen in Figure 8, only 8% of Salvadoran women believe that a husband is justified in beating
his wife. Compared to the rest of the world, El Salvador is within the lowest 20% of countries. El
Salvador reported a value one-tenth that of Mali, Guinea, and the Central African Republic, as
seen in dark red in Figure 9. This number is surprisingly low considering the levels of actual
violence that women endure within the country. These data contradict many popular ideas that
attitudes about VAW and women’s increased threshold for tolerating violence have allowed for
violence to be perpetuated. Therefore, this is perhaps evidence that attitudes about VAW are not
nearly as important as other causal mechanisms such as the civil war, gang violence, and
resource access.

5

This survey asked women ages 15-49 the following questions to gage their attitudes toward
IPV and DV: Is beating justified when wife argues with husband? Is beating justified when wife
refuses to have sex with husband? Is beating justified when wife burns the food? Is beating
justified when wife goes out without telling husband? Is beating justified when wife neglects the
children? These data provide the percentage of all women who agree that a husband and justified
in beating his wife for the aforementioned specific reasons. Examining these data as a 10-year
average from 2008-18 provides more consistent data and accounts for changes over time.
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Figure 9. Percentage of women ages 15-49 who believe a husband is justified in beating his
wife (for any of the following five reasons: when she argues with him; when she refuses to
have sex with him; when she burns the food; when she goes out without telling him; when
she neglects the children), average 2008-2018
Percentage of women who believe husband is justified in beating wife, 2008-18 average
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When we look specifically at El Salvador, three potential explanations for the high
female homicide rate seem to be the country’s civil war, gang proliferation, and women’s access
to resources. In this chapter, I provide a qualitative assessment of El Salvador, seeking to explain
the high female homicide rate within El Salvador. I do this do this by diving deeply into the roles
of the civil war, gang activity, women’s resources, and the weak Salvadoran state. I first test my
hypothesis about civil war by relying on qualitative and quantitative data from years surrounding
the civil war. In my second section, I test my hypothesis about gang activity through time-series
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statistical analysis and qualitative data from NGO’s. In my third section, I test my hypothesis
about women’s resources. More, specifically, I test this by first measuring female school
enrollment levels, and secondly by assessing the strength of women’s organizations and their
ability to push for laws against VAW. Lastly, I discuss the government’s response, focusing
specifically on the measures they are taking to address the VAW epidemic, and whether they are
effective.

i.

Civil War
Due to the risks and highly taboo nature of IPV and DV in El Salvador, women are

reluctant to speak out against male perpetrators, especially if they are their partners. Thus, direct
testimonies from women who denounce their husbands are hard to come by. Although we cannot
know for sure if the Salvadoran civil war directly caused female homicide rates to increase, we
can rely on data from the post-war period. It is important to keep in mind that cross-national data
highlighted in the previous chapter does suggest that post-civil war states do indeed experience
significantly increased female homicide rates.
During the war, many women experienced newfound autonomy due to their partner’s
absence, or from their involvement as a combatant in the FMLN (Shayne 1999). Although there
is little data available, it is certainly likely that DV and IPV rates decreased during the war due to
the fact that the majority of the men were off fighting. Because 30% of the Salvadoran female
population played active roles in the FMLN, many went from situations in which they were
encouraged to use violence as a form of self-defense, to post-conflict, private settings where selfassurance and defense from IPV was not the norm (Viterna 2014, 211).
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Very little changed post-war in regard to female gender roles. Navarro Mantas (2009)
concludes that Salvadoran women were forced back into traditional positions in the home. One
year after the signing of the Peace Accords, 95% of women were reported to exclusively work in
domestic positions (Navarro Mantas 2009, 61). However, what did change was the increase in
sexual abuse and female homicide. Data collected by the Center for Women’s Studies reveals
that “in the first third of 1995, reported cases of physical, psychological and sexual abuse of
women and children rose 200 per cent over the number reported in the same period of 1994”
(IPS 1995). Two years after peace was established, abuse against women in all its forms
skyrocketed. It is clear that male violent backlash increased in response to female independence
in the directly post-war period.
Reported IPV and sexual violence rates increased in post-war El Salvador, with rapes
increasing from “382 in 1996 to 818 in 2001” (Call 2003). Because 8 of every 10 murdered
women in El Salvador is killed by a spouse or former partner, the likelihood of de-mobilized
combatants taking out their anger on their wives is very high. Domestic violence rates also
increased in this period, as noted by ISDEMU. In 1995, the ISDEMU received 1,753 reports of
DV; 2,172 cases in 1996; and 3,845 cases in 1997 (United States Department of State 1999).
This degrading domestic violence is presented in multiple forms, including, but not limited to,
repeated rapes, sexual assaults, and life-threatening physical abuse (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees 2015). The first six months of 1995 experienced a 33% increase in
‘mistreatment of women’ from the final six months of 1994, when peace was supposedly already
established (Unites States Department of State 1995). Even in the directly post-war period,
reports of VAW increase notably, suggesting the war as a potential trigger for VAW rates.
The immediate post-war period additionally experienced an uptick in extremely brutal
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violence, much of which was directly related to the civil war. Torture and brutally violent tactics
used during the 12-year war became engrained in the population. This violence was learned, and
duplicated in the post-war period. The UNCHR 2004 report notes that 2002 and 2003 saw an
increase in what they classified as “extremely violent murders of women” (Etürk 2004, 9). The
victims were teens between 15-20, and were all raped, tortured, mutilated, and in some cases
decapitated. The bodies were dumped in public spaces around San Salvador. At the time, many
noted the similarity of these killings to the death squad’s execution style in the 70’s, in which
bodies were tortured and abandoned in public spaces to instigate fear within the community
(Ertürk 2004, 9). Almost a decade after the signing of the peace accords, war tactics and
executions were still duplicated, mirroring actions of death squad members, and violence
continually played out on the bodies of women.

ii.

Gang Presence
Because gangs within El Salvador solidified around the same time that civil war ended, it is

important to recognize the intertwined nature of these two aspects of Salvadoran history. The
civil war provided fertile ground for gang proliferation within El Salvador (Applebaum and
Mawby 2018). It led to heightened reported levels of VAW, and strengthened gang membership.
Although gangs were born out of the civil war, they took on an increasingly violent life of their
own in the post-war period.
In an already male-dominated country such as El Salvador, gang culture and organized crime
have exacerbated already underlying gendered processes of violence and abuse. Because men
and boys are often centered in conversations about gangs in El Salvador, there exists much less
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available research that focuses solely on the violent complexities of women’s relationships to
gang members. Centering women in conversations about organized crime is crucial to humanize
their experiences, and uncovering gang’s attitudes towards female subjects serves as an
important link to its potential role as a causal factor in the increased female homicide rate in El
Salvador.
Patriarchal power, already pervasive demonstrations of machismo, and ‘hegemonic
masculinity’ are often aggravated by gang members. Due to endemic corruption, police are
unable to protect women in these situations. It is not uncommon for police to collaborate with
gangs, allowing sexual violence and threats to persist without punishment. Bringing women into
conversation about organized crime and gangs is key to understanding the many-pronged forms
of VAW and the levels of emigration from El Salvador.
Although these gangs are not drug organizations, they generate some profits from Mexican
cartels who subcontract them to move drugs up through the region (Grillo 2016). Women who
live in towns that are controlled by gangs used for drug transportation are more vulnerable to turf
wars and gang violence (Lynn 2017). In many cases, women are either caught in the crossfire of
rivaling gangs, or murdered simply because they live in gang territory (Organización de Mujeres
Salvadoreñas por la Paz (ORMUSA) 2008). Central American gangs are also “heavily involved
in sex trafficking,” which makes up part of their revenue (Davis 2007). However, the principal
source of their revenue comes from extortion fees, la renta, that gang members force and
intimidate communities into paying (Wolf 2012, Schmidt and Buechler 2017). In an especially
2016 brutal case, Barrio 18 members shot a 65-year-old female storeowner 27 times because she
refused to give away her products for free to gang members (Diario1 2016). Gangs make it clear
that their actions cannot be questioned.
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While there is much less documented evidence of women in gangs, evidence seems to
suggest that female gang members are not exempt from violence. Women oftentimes join gangs
in hopes of escaping abuse at home, only to find themselves abused physically and emotionally
by their fellow gang members after they are initiated, and “are more likely than their male
peers…to be punished for violations of gang rules” (Wolf 2014, 130). The process of initiation
into gangs for women is different than it is for men. Female Central American former gang
members report that their initiation processes involved rape by over “a dozen or so of her
homeboys one night,” sexual favors, and orders to kill rival gang members or rob civilians; many
women in Central American gangs “stradd[le] the line between victims and victimizers.” (Lacey
2008, A1). It is difficult to escape this cycle once they have proven loyalty to a gang.
Evidence suggests that gang and organized crime proliferation in the post-war period may
also play a large role in explaining the country’s high female homicide rate. Sources contend that
male control over female bodies is an integral piece of gang culture in El Salvador (International
Crisis Group 2017b). VAW is often used as a gang tactic. Female bodies are used to
“strategically eliminate strict boundaries between gangs and communities (when neighborhood
girls are taken as novias) in order to lessen local resistance; and to humiliate communities into
submission (via widespread sexual violence)” (Applebaum and Mowby 2018, 11). Gangs play
out their personal rivalries on women’s bodies (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
2016a). In a 2015, a 72-year-old woman and her granddaughter were each shot in the head by
two gang members while riding the bus home from shopping. The PNC reported that the victims
had no gang ties; instead, this was an act of revenge due to territorial rivalries between
neighboring gangs (ISDEMU 2015, 54). The UNODC reports that girlfriends, sisters, or mothers
of gang members are commonly attacked by rival gangs as a way to get personal revenge,
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murdering or raping their “most vulnerable possession” (Immigration and Refugee Board of
Canada 2016b). There are many accounts of Salvadoran gang members sending death threats or
killing the family members of girls who refused to go out with them (Grillo 2016, 193). Gang
members also harass young women in public which creates a constant “state of insecurity and
unease among women” and engrains in them a deep-seated fear of sexual violence (Winton
2005, 175). Women cannot turn down gang members sexual advances, and are used as collateral
in gang disputes. ORMUSA notes that young women are most affected by both gang violence
and female homicide.
In March of 2012, the government, assisted by the Catholic church, mediated a truce
between the main two rivaling gangs (Barrio 18 and MS-13) (Universidad centroamericana José
Simeón Cañas 2014). In exchange for reducing homicides, the government agreed to allow
already imprisoned gang members certain privileges (special visitation, less security, phone
access to communicate outside the prison) (Katz, Hedberg et al. 2016). As seen in Figure 10,
2012 is correlated with a steep reduction of female homicides. In the same period as the truce,
recorded female homicides dropped from 628 in 2011, to 322 in 2012, 217 in 2013, and 294 in
2014, according to UNODC Data (United Nations Crime Trends Survey (UN-CTS) 2011, 2012,
2013, 2014, 2015). While some say that the truce began to crumble in June 2013, PNC
announced that the truce had officially ended in March 2014, after exactly two years (Lohmuller
2014, Latin America Working Group 2016). 2013, halfway through the truce, saw the lowest
level of female homicides in over a decade. From 2012-2014, female homicide rates were pushed
back to their levels in the 2000’s. The immediate and sudden 50% drop in female homicides
during the gang truce suggests that organized crime activity plays a significant role in affecting
VAW rates. 2015 marked the end of the gangs’ truce, which is clearly marked in Figure 10, with
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a boomerang effect return to ‘violence as usual’ pre-truce.
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Figure 11 offers an even closer look at the time period around the gang truce. In April
2012, the first full month of truce, reported female homicides plummeted, dropping by 50%. The
following months continue with very low reports, until June 2013, which recorded 27 female
homicides—the highest since March 2012 when the truce began. June 2013 is also the period
when the truce between gangs began to falter; however, female homicides still stay somewhat
low, until March 2014 when the truce is officially over. By April, female homicides reached 33,
almost equal to that of March 2012 (pre-truce) which recorded 38. It seems as though gang
ceasefire has a notable effect on female homicides, thus suggesting that gangs do seem to play a
significant role. Whether women are used as pawns in gang wars, accidentally caught up in gang
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crossfire, or actively involved in gang violence, the link between gang presence and female
homicide cannot be ignored.
Figure 11. El Salvador: Intentional Female Homicides by Month, 2011-2015
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Civil war attitudes and gang proliferation may explain part of El Salvador’s high female
homicide rate, but in order to get a fuller picture, other factors at play must also be examined,
such as the key roles of female educational access, and women’s groups responses to this VAW
epidemic. I now test my hypothesis of women’s resources in El Salvador, discussing both female
educational enrollment levels, and prominent women’s organizations within the country.
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iii.

Women’s Resources
We can see how the civil war and gang violence have clearly affected El Salvador’s

female homicide rate, but what role does women’s resource access play? Cross-national research
from my literature review has underscored that when women have more resources, there is less
violence and less homicide.
In this section, I now test my hypothesis about women’s resources within the context of
El Salvador. This section is two-pronged. I first discuss women’s resources as measured by
female educational enrollment, and engage with time-series data to see how these rates change
over time, and whether they fall into the inverted-U shape that I predicted. Next, I discuss the
role of women’s organizations, and analyze their strength and capacity to influence VAW rates
within El Salvador. The majority of this section is dedicated to an in-depth analysis of women’s
organizations within El Salvador, as I have already tested my hypothesis of women’s resources
as measured by educational attainment cross-nationally.

Education
Available cross-national data does indeed suggest that countries with lower female
educational attainment rates may also experience higher female homicide rates. However,
because this cross-national data (Figure 8) did not present the inverted-U trend that I had
predicted, I now test this hypothesis explicitly within El Salvador through time-series statistical
analysis. I consult with data provided by the World Bank.
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As opposed to using women’s educational attainment as a measure, in Figure 12, I use a
gross female enrollment ratio which indicates the percent of girls currently enrolled in secondary
school who are of schooling age. I engaged with data specifically that reflected female
enrollment in secondary school because the completion of this school level indicates a
foundation of basic education and is key for human development (UNESCO Institute for
Statistics). Data in Figure 12 were collected by UNESCO Institute for Statistics (1971-2018).
Figure 12. El Salvador: Secondary School Enrollment, Female (% gross), 1971-2018
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As visible in Figure 12, women’s enrollment in secondary school has increased steadily
over time. While there are no available data from 1981-1990 (this was during the civil war), or
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from 1994-1997, the post-civil war years do indicate gradually rising female school enrollment
levels. Because the women consulted in my cross-national analysis of female educational
attainment (Figure 8) were of 25 years-of-age and older, it is likely that El Salvador registered
such low rates of female secondary school attainment (40%) because the majority of this
population was of school age during the civil war, when education was probably not available.
Although there are no available data for these years, it is expected that school enrollment
decreased due to civil war violence and insecurity. Both high female homicide, and low levels of
women’s school enrollment in the 1980’s and 90’s is a direct result of the civil war. Wartime
violence likely led to a severe drop in female education, and also appears to have contributed to
increased female homicide rates. The education of an entire female generation that was of
schooling age during the war was lost. However, if we assume that the number of girls going to
school during the war was lower that it was in the pre-war era, Figure 12 clearly highlights how
this rate took off post-war. With levels almost reaching 80% of in recent years, data in Figure 12
suggests that El Salvador has made great strides to keep girls in school. As this ‘lost generation’
of women with low education levels due to the civil war are slowly ageing, the most current
generation of girls seem to have much potential.
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Figure 13. El Salvador: Secondary School Enrollment, Female (% gross), and Intentional
Female Homicides (per 100,000), 2005-2017
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Figure 13 provides a closer look at girls’ enrollment in secondary school in recent years,
and its relation to female homicide rates. The current enrollment rates are encouraging, with
levels steadily hovering around 70% in the past 10 years. While female educational enrollment is
increasing, female homicide does not appear to be following any specific trend; Figure 13 does
not indicate the inverted-U shape that I had hypothesized. I assert that we must revisit this
phenomenon in the future when we have more available female homicide data to more clearly
understand if the inverted-U theory manifests within El Salvador. Perhaps in 15-20 years when
the educated girls of today are in their 30s or 40s, we will see the positive effects of their
increased education rates reflected in a decreased female homicide rate. If there is an inverted-U
relationship between female education and female homicide, I posit that El Salvador is still on
the upswing of this inverted-U shape, and has yet to reach its ‘tipping point.’ In terms of trends
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that the available data show, it appears that female school enrollment rates do indeed need to be
close to 100% in order for the ‘protective effects’ of secondary education to take action (Vyas
and Watts 2009).
Women today in El Salvador do have access to education at a greater extent than they did
in the past; however, available data demonstrates that female homicide rates have also risen with
this rate. Currently, there is not enough data on female homicide rate in El Salvador to clearly
comment on any inverted-U relationship. However, we should revisit this data over the next few
decades years when there is a long enough timeframe to see if El Salvador has reached its VAW
apex, and is on its way down.

Women’s Organizations
While I have tested my hypothesis of women’s resources in both a cross-national and
time-series way by measuring women’s educational attainment, I now test it focusing on women
resources as women’s organizing. In this section, I analyze the role that Salvadoran women’s
organizations play in addressing VAW levels. More specifically, I look at how women’s groups
in El Salvador have influenced legislative outcomes. Cross-national quantitative research
conducted by Htun and Weldon (2012) underscore how autonomous feminist social movements
are key catalysts for progressive VAW policies. Women’s groups drive this change because they
are able to “articulate social group perspectives, disseminate new ideas and frames for the
broader public, and demand institutional changes that recognize these meanings” (Htun and
Weldon 2012, 552). While the Salvadoran government may appear to have established several
laws and mechanisms to combat VAW and female homicide (which I discuss more in depth in
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the next section), on-the-ground women’s groups have also been working to hold the government
accountable for their actions, and to formulate these very laws. In this section, I assess the
strength and ability of women’s organizations to enforce VAW laws and implementation, and
provide women access to services.
It is clear that in El Salvador, as women’s autonomy and collective action grows, so does
the emergence of civil society women’s organizations. Navas (2018) notes that Salvadoran
women’s organization are born out of periods of sociocultural transitions within society. The
period during and immediately post-war led to the rise of female collective organization, due in
part to women’s organizational experience as guerillas in the FMLN, and their frustration with
their lack of recognition during the peace process (Navas 2018, 79).

Table 1. Most Notable Salvadoran Women’s Organizations
Organization

Type

Location

Organizacion de mujeres
salvadoreñas por la paz
(ORMUSA)
Salvadoran women’s
organization for peace

Civil society
organization

San Salvador

Instituto salvadoreño para
el Desarrollo de la Mujer
(ISDEMU)
Salvadoran Institute for
Women’s Development

Governmental
mechanism

Asociación para la
autodeterminación y
desarrollo de mujeres
salvadoreñas
(AMS)
Association for the selfdetermination and

Civil society
organization

Headquarters:
San Salvador,
and one office
in each
department
(14 total)
San Salvador

Date
founded
1985

Role in El Salvador

1996

Created to uphold the
DV Act and the
National Plan to
Prevent Domestic
Violence

1987

Prevent VAW and
sexual exploitation in
municipalities with
high rates

National observatory
that collects
information on VAW
from the IML, PNC,
and MJSP
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development of Salvadoran
women
Asociación de Mujeres por
la Dignidad y la vida
(Las Dignas)
Association of women for
dignity and life

Civil society
organization

San Salvador,
La Paz,
Usulután,

1990

Mutual assistance
groups, legal services
and literacy training to
help VAW victims
navigate legal system

La Asociación de Mujeres
Mélida Anaya Montes
(Las Mélidas)
Association of women ‘
Mélida Anaya Montes’

Civil society
organization

San Salvador;
Santa Ana

1992

Safe houses for women
VAW, legal literacy
training, psychosocial
treatment

La concertación feminsta
Prudencia Ayala
(CFPA)
The feminist pact of
Prudencia Ayala
La Colectiva Feminista
para el Desarrollo Local
(CFDL)
The feminist collective for
local development
Ciudad Mujer
(comprehensive support
system for women)

Civil society
collective

Cross-national
collective

Unified collective of
over 20 different civil
society feminist
organizations

Civil society
organization

Cross-national 2004
collective

Reproductive rights
training, sexual health
education, sexual
violence prevention

Governmental
social
program

Centers in 6
municipalities
: Colón,
Usulután,
Santa Ana,
San Martín,
San Miguel,
Morazán

Combination of 15
different Salvadoran
government agencies
(services for sexual and
reproductive health,
economic
empowerment, VAW
support)

2011

Table 1 provides an overview of the most notable contemporary Salvadoran women’s
organizations and collectives, their locations, and a summary of their services. As seen in Table
1, this process of female collective organization post-war is especially clear in the case of La
Asociación de Mujeres Mélida Anaya Montes (Las Mélidas), which was founded in the same
year as the civil war ended, and emerged in response to the lack of support for women within the
FMLN (Luciak 1999). Las Dignas, founded in 1990, near the end of the war, was similarly
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created by FMLN members. These founders ultimately broke from the guerrilla movement, and
became completely autonomous from the FMLN structure (Luciak 1999). Most notably, Morena
Herrera, a FMLN commander and top military strategist during the civil war, and current
Salvadoran feminist leader, acted as a catalyst post-war. Herrera assisted in founding multiple
different women’s organizations: Las Dignas (1990), La Colectiva Feminista para el Desarrollo
Local (2004), and currently serves as president of the Agrupación Ciudadana por la
Despenalización del Aborto en El Salvador since 2009, which provides legal support to women
jailed for abortions (International Women’s Media Foundation , Casa Amèrica Catalunya 2018).
As women gained access to more resources, there became a greater emergence of civil society
women’s organizations. Over the years, since the peace accords, feminist organizations became
much more prevalent in El Salvador.
While these women’s groups are effective alone, they are far stronger and much more
successful when they work together. When women from different walks of life stand together in
solidarity, they work as a united front, applying pressure on the government to pass VAW laws.
This phenomenon is especially clear when examining La concertación feminsta Prudencia Ayala
(CFPA) This collective was founded in the early 2000’s, and is made up of over 20 different
Salvadoran feminist organizations. This group’s name is a nod to the indigenous Salvadoran
feminist and writer of the early 20th century, Prudencia Ayala, who was also the country’s first
female presidential candidate in 1930.
The sixth Encounter (Encuentro) of Latin American and Caribbean Feminists, held in
Costa del Sol, El Salvador, in 1993, served as an important connection between local and
international feminist movements. Silber and Viterna (2009) highlights how this conference
created a space for Salvadoran feminist groups to hear of the struggles of other revolutionary
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women (especially Sandinistas), and also flooded them with international aid and resources to
promote their agendas, independent from the government (342-3).
Women’s organizations in El Salvador appear to have grown in strength and size postwar, but have they influenced VAW legislation? In the following two sections, I give a brief
overview of the four most important laws adopted by the Salvadoran government to combat
VAW, and comment on the role of women’s organizations in shaping VAW legislative
outcomes.

VAW Legislation
From a legislative standpoint, the Salvadoran government seems to be invested in
reducing VAW rates. El Salvador has passed impressively progressive laws to counter VAW,
ranging from specific legislations that denounce feminicidio, to the creation of special tribunal
courts to deal with VAW laws (Colbert 2019, 68). For the purposes of my study, I focus on four
key laws that specifically address domestic violence and female homicide. I discuss the Ley
Contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar (LVI, Law against Domestic Violence), Penal Code article
200, the Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicación de la Discriminación contra las Mujeres (LIE
or Law of Equality, Equity, and Eradication of Discrimination against Women) and the Ley
Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para la Mujeres (LEIV, Law for a Life Free
of Violence against Women).

La Ley Contra la Violencia Intrafamiliar (LVI), 1996
The LVI, passed in 1996, denounced intra-familiar violence, and served to “prevent the violence
rather than punish it” (Musalo 2018, 48). Prior to 1996, domestic violence could be committed
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with no punishment. The Article 3 of the LVI defines interfamilial violence as “any act or
omission, whether direct or indirect, that causes injury; physical, sexual or psychological
suffering; or death to family members” (1996). The 1996 version of the LVI permits only judges
of peace and family courts the right to issue protective measures against the perpetrator.
Reformed subsequently over the years, the 2014 reform gave police the right to issue temporary
protection measures of up to 48 hours (Musalo 2018, 51).

Penal Code article 200, 1998
The Salvadoran penal code was first established in 1904, and provides criminal laws and
sentencing for crimes (Mobilia 2020, 1340). Article 200, passed in 1998, explicitly criminalizes
perpetrators of domestic violence with a mandatory 1 to 3-year prison sentence (Article 200cite). Feminicide is not specifically mentioned in the penal code (Mobilia 2020). Similar to the
LVI, this law also only defines gender violence within the familial realm, thus failing to give
women comprehensive justice.

La Ley de Igualdad, Equidad y Erradicación de la Discriminación contra las Mujeres (LIE),
2012
As one of the few anti-discriminatory laws enacted, the 2012 LIE was established to promote
gender equality across Salvadoran society and institutions. However, this law applies only to
state institutions; private individuals are exempt.

La Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para la Mujeres (LEIV), 2012
The adoption of the LEIV in 2012 was groundbreaking not only in its scope and its
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commitment to ending VAW in all of its forms. This 61-part law guarantees the right of women
to a life free of violence through “detection, prevention, care, protection, reparation, and
punishment of violence against women” (2011). Most importantly, Decree 520 made feminicide
a crime, with a sentence of 20-35 years. Furthermore, this special law made the ISDEMU (See
Table 1) the lead agency responsible for fulfilling the law, tasking them with annual reports and
the formulation of a National Action Plan to address VAW.
It must also be noted that Decree 286, which established specialized courts to deal with
cases on violence and discrimination against women was originally included in the initial drafts
of the LEIV in 2010, but eventually removed for funding purposes (Musalo 2018, 78). The
Legislative Assembly eventually passed Decree 286 in 2016, which would give these specialized
courts jurisdiction over all crimes listed in the LEIV, except for cases involving interfamilial and
sexual violence (the most common forms of VAW) (Musalo 2018, 79). With the purpose of
removing sensitive gender-based violence cases from a historically patriarchal judicial system
that rarely punishes male perpetrators, Decree 286 calls for judges with bias-training to attend
VAW cases, and requests the presence of psychologists and social workers (although it is unclear
how large the allocated budget is) (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016b, Huttner
2020).

Impact of Women’s Organizations on VAW Legislation
Many of the four aforementioned laws were proposed and pushed through by feminist
organizations in El Salvador; women’s groups are directly involved in VAW legislation.
The LIE was crafted and pushed through by Salvadoran women’s organizations,
specifically by the civil society collective La concertación feminista de Prudencia Ayala
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(CFPA), with support from the UN Womens Fund for Gender Equality (UN Women 2011).
Activists in El Salvador sought out alliances from national and international organizations, and
aligned with women in all positions of power. María Elena Alvarado, a prominent activist and
member of CFPA described their campaign strategy as “guerrilla warfare”; the activists sat in at
the Legislative Assembly each day, demanding that their law not be forgotten (UN Women
2011). Especially important within the CFPA in pushing forward this law were Las Dignas, Las
Mélidas, and ORMUSA, each of which were able to reach out to their respective contacts at both
the governmental, institutional, and societal levels to garner support.
There is ample evidence of feminist influence seeping into governmental positions in El
Salvador. For example, Yanira Argueta, founder and director of the AMS in 1987, integrated into
the political and governmental spheres, and now is the current director of ISDEMU (ISDEMU).
During Argueta’s time as director of ISDEMU, she pushed adamantly to pass the LEIV and the
LIE. Women in positions of power within the government who are both firm defenders of
women’s rights, and have links to civil society women’s organizations, often are able to bring
women’s issues to the forefront.
El Salvador’s unicameral Legislative Assembly was led by FMLN representative Lorena
Guadalupe Peña Mendoza from 2015-16. Peña was not only the third woman in the country’s
history to occupy the position, but also was a former FMLN guerrilla commander, active
participant in the 1992 Peace Accords, and founder of Las Mélidas in 1992. As a member of the
legislative assembly from 1994-2000, she pushed for the passing of the LVI and Penal code
article 200. Women in positions of power in El Salvador do indeed vouch for laws to protect
women’s safety, and promote equality. Before Lorena Peña held the post, Gloria Salguero Gross
acted as president of El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly from 1994-1997. Under her leadership,
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El Salvador ratified the Convención Belem Do Pará, and adopted the LVI, which denounced
intra-familial violence and domestic violence (Alba Evelyn Cortez de Alvarenga 2011).
Women’s groups working within the legislature have made important strides in pushing
forward laws, as well as keeping ties with on-the-ground civil society women’s organizations.
Known as the Legislative Triad (la Tríada Legislativa), the Grupo Parlamentario de Mujeres
(GPM, Parlaimentary Women’s Group), the Comisión de la Mujer y la Igualdad de Género
(Comission of Women and Gender Equality), and the Unidad de Género (Gender Unit) all form
part of El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly. Each mechanism provides technical and legal
support to one another, so that VAW and gender equality laws can be passed more easily
(Asemblea Legislativa de la República de El Salvador). The GPM was founded in 2005, but only
became active at the end of 2009. Currently comprised of 26 women across parties, the group has
played a key role in advocating for both the LIE and the LEIV. In an interview with Milena
Calderón, member and vice president of the GPM, she revealed that the group’s commitment to
the LEIV and the pressure that the group applied to their fellow parliamentarians to approve the
law was critical in successfully passing it (Calderón 2011). She noted that “if it weren’t for the
work of the Grupo Parlamentario de Mujeres, there would not have been much commitment on
the part of the parliamentarians who approved and passed the law”6 [translation] (Calderón
2011).
Through the GPM, the relationship between the legislature and women’s organizations
has substantially improved. The Gender and Equality United Nations Development Program

“Si no hubiera habido este trabajo comprometido desde el Grupo Parlamentario (de Mujeres)
no hubiera habido tanto compromiso de parte de todos los parlamentarios que aprobaron y
pasaron la ley [LEIV]”
6
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cites that the connection between CFPA and GPM has created a space where gender issues and
opinions are discussed and shared (Programa de la Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo 2014).
This link between women’s civil society collectives and women groups within politics seems to
be key; the LEIV and LIE were both pushed through by female parliamentarians and feminist
organizations working together.
Quantitative research conducted by Htun and Weldon (2012) highlights women’s groups
as the most effective actors at pushing forward VAW laws and holding the government
accountable. Although the governments implement and enforce the law, women’s groups act as
the ‘monitoring agents,’ holding the state accountable, and demanding change (UN Women
2011). VAW legislation appears to be the outcome of female organizations’ collective work. I
have shown that Salvadoran women’s organizations were key in applying pressure to reach the
‘tipping point,’ where substantial legislation was passed to protect women and promote gender
justice. However, as I discuss in the following section, the passage and implementation of laws
does not necessarily ensure their enforcement.

iv.

Governmental Response to VAW
In this section, I assess the effectiveness of the government’s response to the epidemic of

VAW. I seek to answer the questions: ‘what is the government doing to combat VAW?’ and ‘are
these measures effective?’ Insofar as the government has not been effective in reducing VAW, I
try to assess the extent to which this has resulted from indifference or incompetence. In this
section, I analyze the laws put in place to combat VAW and try to assess the government’s
efforts to enforce these laws.
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El Salvador has taken numerous steps to sign on to international treaties and laws over
the years. The country has ratified major international human rights agreements, such as the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
(ratified in 1981), and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará) (ratified in 1995).
CEDAW is commonly referred to as the ‘international bill of rights for women,’ and denounces
all forms of discrimination against women and girls in the civil, economic, political, and social
spheres (International Women’s Development Agency (IWDA) and Women’s Action for Voice
and Empowerment (WAVE) 2019). The Belém do Pará Convention of 1994 defined violence
against women as “any act or conduct, based on gender, which causes death or physical, sexual
or psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private sphere” and
classifies VAW as a violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms (ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICAN STATES 1994). Furthermore, the treaty called for mechanisms that both
defended and protected women from violence (ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES
1994). Additionally, El Salvador is a member state of the Community of Latin American States
(CELAC), which implemented the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action at the Fourth
World Conference on Women in 1995. This conference set strategic actions for gender equality
and the advancement of women, specialized in VAW, poverty, armed conflict, and human rights.
International pressure due to these conventions appeared to be a catalyst for El Salvador’s speedy
creation of the first comprehensive law condoning interfamilial violence in 1996, suggesting that
El Salvador does adopt VAW laws in response to international pressure.
The establishment of VAW legislation does not necessarily ensure its enforcement, but
rather provides insight into how laws embody a general acceptance of what was considered
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permissible behavior by the government. It is clear that over the past decade, El Salvador has
indeed made legislative and institutional advances to punish VAW perpetrators, and foster
gender equality. Despite these efforts, however, female homicides have only continued to rise, as
has impunity for the crimes. In the following section, I gage the effectiveness of the
aforementioned laws, and analyze whether government’s failures to address VAW rates stem
from indifference or incompetence.

Effectiveness and Enforcement of VAW Legislation
Despite the plethora of laws passed to mitigate VAW and promote gender justice, since
the implementation of the most recent VAW laws (the LEIV and LIE) in 2012, El Salvador’s
female homicide rate has increased from 9.76 in 2012 to 13.83 in 2017 (World Bank 2012-2017).
As seen in Figure 14, the female homicide rate decreased slightly since the adoption of the LEIV
and LIE in 2012 (which may also be due to the gang truce which began the same year), and then
spiked dramatically in 2015, registering a rate of 17.16. The extensive legal framework in place
to address VAW provides some insight into the steps that the government is taking to mitigate
this issue, but whether it is enforced is a different question.
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Figure 14. El Salvador, Intentional Female Homicides (per 100,000 female), 2005-2017
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This notable increase in VAW since the adoption of the LEIV and LIE suggests that these
laws have been slow to bring meaningful change to the country, and have done little to improve
women’s safety. Are these laws adequately enforced, or are they for show? Do the laws truly
protect women, and has the state actively been working to decreased VAW and female
homicides? These are some of the questions I aim to answer in this section.

Feminicidio as a symbol of progress
El Salvador is one of the eighteen countries in Latin America and the Caribbean which
has established feminicide as a specific crime (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) 2019). On one hand, El Salvador’s adoption of this law does indeed indicate that the
government takes VAW rates somewhat seriously, but the extent to which it is effective is
questionable. The word ‘feminicidio’ itself has a radical and progressive ring, indicating perhaps
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the extent of feminist influence within the government. However, feminicidio is realistically
difficult to both prove and to prosecute. The proper enforcement and prosecution of feminicidio
requires ample resources, and a budget much larger than has been allocated. A 2016 report
reveals that the rate of impunity for crimes involving feminicide are still as high as 77% (The
Advocates for Human Rights 2016). Classifying a murder of a woman as feminicidio may not
really make a difference from classifying it as homicide, considering that impunity rates are high,
and the crime is extremely difficult to prove. As Musalo (2018) concurs, “the categorization of a
killing as a feminicide rather than as a homicide may have more symbolic than practical
significance” (71). It appears this analysis may hold some truth; the government is not
completely indifferent, but does indeed lack abilities to enforce the law. I now dive into all of the
VAW laws, focusing on their enforcement and their effect on female homicide.

Institutional Biases
Deep-rooted patriarchal biases within governmental institutions is a prominent obstacle to
the proper enforcement of these four aforementioned VAW laws. In many instances, the judges
and government officials themselves refuse to implement or uphold these laws that protect
women. Silvia Barrios, a lawyer at ORMUSA reported that “several senior judges have
denounced the Special Integrated Law for a Life Free of Violence against Women [LEIV] as
‘unconstitutional’, insisting they would not implement it in their courts” because they believe it
would give women unequal protection that men do not receive (Lakhini 2013, Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada 2016b). VAW laws will continually fail to protect women if biases
and sexist attitudes within law enforcement do not change. Esther Major, Amnesty
International’s El Salvador Expert similarly echoed Barrios in an interview, saying that women
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are continually left in dangerous situations due to “failure of police and justice officials to ensure
protection orders are delivered and complied with. There are cases of the judiciary failing to
apply the new law, resulting in lesser penalties for perpetrators” (Lakhini 2013). Institutional
biases, especially the judiciary failing to uphold the very laws designed to protect women, has
reinforced the culture of impunity for VAW perpetrators. José Franco Castillo, a coordinator at
the National Judiciary Council’s School of Judicial Training (Escuela de Capacitación del
Consejo Nacional de la Judicatura), commented that 30-40% of judges see certain instances of
domestic violence (such as a husband beating his wife for not having dinner on the table when he
arrives home from work) as “justifiable” (Franco Castillo 2012). Sexism within the judiciary is
pervasive, contributing to poor enforcement of VAW laws in place to protect women.

Funding
While biases are part of the problem, VAW laws also lack adequate funding to be
properly enforced. Interviews with members of ORMUSA, the Center for Gender and Refugee
Studies (CGRS), the Salvadoran Legislative Assembly, and Oxfam all indicate that gender issues
continually receive insufficient funding due to lack of political will, and limited resources
(Musalo 2018, 62). Vilma Vaquerano, VAW expert at ORMUSA concurs, “as a poor country,
budget will always be a problem, but really the problem is that violence against women is not
prioritized and the limited budget is just an excuse” (Vaquerano Cruz 2012). Even more
concerning, data from the Salvadoran ministry of Finance reveals that the already low budgets
for Ciudad Mujer decreased by $2.06 million from 2019 to 2020. Similarly, the executive wing’s
budget allotted to departmental programs which support the LIE and LEIV decreased by $1.91
million within the same timeframe (Panorama Económico 2019). Clearly, the government is not
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allocating the necessary resources to combat the country’s VAW epidemic. Budgetary
allocations indicate governmental commitment to the laws, and El Salvador is not providing the
necessary funds to enforce the VAW laws in place, thus reducing the laws to merely a symbolic
aspiration.

Impunity
VAW crimes are rarely reported, and when they are, the chance that the perpetrator will
be brought to trial and sentenced is extremely unlikely. Impunity levels in El Salvador for VAW
crimes are incredibly high. ORMUSA reports that in 2016 and 2017, less than 5% of the reported
6,326 crimes against women were followed through until trial (U.S. Department of State Bureau
of Democracy 2018). Similarly, of the 978 reported cases of VAW in 2014, only four resulted in
guilty verdicts (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016b). Contemporary gang
proliferation has also coincided with high rates of impunity. According to ORMUSA, 10 out of
11 feminicides committed by gang members are classified as a crime connected to ‘illicit
associations’ or as a ‘less serious crime’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016b).
This may indeed be likened to organized crime’s strong grip on El Salvador’s already weak and
corrupt judicial system. Impunity for crimes relating to VAW appears to stem from judicial
corruption, lack of thorough investigation into crimes (due to scarce administrative and
economic resources), and patriarchal biases which do not see VAW crimes as worth prosecuting.

A Weak and Overwhelmed State
The state’s inability to lower female homicide rates may indeed stem in part from
incompetence. Considering the highly patriarchal society that is El Salvador and how the needs
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of women have historically been second to the needs of men, it is no surprise that female
homicide and VAW problems are not being taken seriously or effectively tackled. Overwhelmed
with gang, drug, and structural violence that most often affects men, the government may indeed
be too caught up dealing with male-on-male homicide, organized crime proliferation and
extortion to prioritize VAW legislation enforcement. If the Salvadoran government cannot
effectively handle the economic and critical social problems plaguing their country, that is, the
high male homicide rate and extreme extortion, then it is not surprising that they cannot
effectively tackle and mitigate VAW and female homicide rates.
As seen in Figure 15, male homicide rates are exponentially higher than female homicide
rates in El Salvador. Since the early 2000’s, El Salvador’s male homicide rate has consistently
been one of the highest in the world. Most of these deaths can be attributed to gang violence
between MS-13, B-18, and state forces. Despite gang truces and intervention programs,
government crackdown efforts seem to have only exacerbated the violence, as seen in 2015,
when the male homicide rate reached an all-time high of 204.46 (per 100,000).
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Understanding the Salvadoran government’s inability to control high rates of extortion
highlights the general incompetence of the state to effectively control and enforce any laws.
Méndez (2019) estimates that Salvadorans pay roughly $390 million dollars in extortion fees per
years (378), while other estimates range up to $756 million per year (3% of GDP) (International
Crisis Group 2017b). Each person in El Salvador pays anywhere from $60 to $118 per year in
gang extortions, which is significant, especially considering that El Salvador’s GDP per capita is
roughly $3,000.7 A study conducted by the Salvadoran Central Bank reveals that the total cost of
this violence on the economy (including medical costs from gang violence, extortions to
businesses, lost income of people deterred from working), is roughly 16% of the country’s total

However, according to 2019 World Bank data, 23% of El Salvador’s population is living below
the national poverty line (based on $5.5 per person per day), thus suggesting that the average
Salvadoran makes much less than $3,000 per year (World Bank 2019)
7
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GDP (Peñate, de Escobar et al. 2016). Gangs appear to have an incredibly strong grip on El
Salvador’s economy, and have significant costs on the government.
Taking into account that male homicide rates are incredibly high, and gang extortion is
ruining the country’s economy, it is not surprising that the government has not made significant
strides in lowering the female homicide rate. The government’s inability to control things that it
presumably cares about highlights its general incompetence, and its weakness as a state. In the
current climate, effectively enforcing VAW laws is neither the Salvadoran government’s main
concern nor is it realistically possible.

Police and Law Enforcement
Insofar as the Salvadoran government is incompetent, I now discuss the country’s
national police force (Policía Nacional Civil, PNC), which the state is not realistically in control
of. Much evidence points to police as part of the problem; a large portion of the PNC is either
corrupt and looks the other way when VAW is reported, or they exacerbate and directly
perpetrate this gendered violence.
There exists much documented evidence of police officers collaborating directly with
gang members, and directing and collecting extortion fees (Méndez 2019, 279). This suggests
that they are operating partially outside of governmental norms, not following laws, and
inadequately enforcing VAW legislation.
Both “perceived and actual corruption” affect the PNC’s abilities to effectively cooperate
with Salvadoran citizens, especially women who seek to report abuse (Overseas Security
Advisory Council 2020). Because police are known to collaborate with gangs, women who are
abused or assaulted by a gang member almost never report their crime out of fear of retaliation,
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or being considered as a police informant (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016b).
Some police officers “blame women for provoking an assault,” or simply disregard women’s
experiences altogether (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016, Colbert 2019, 70).
Women are caught in an impossible situation. Those who do report their abuse to police are
disbelieved or put in harm’s way, and those who do not report it keep to themselves out of fear
from a violent backlash from their partner, and put themselves at risk of continued abuse
(Colbert 2019, 71). It is important to note that police intervention during domestic violence
disputes is critical, especially considering that chronic IPV oftentimes ends in female homicide.
Police provide inadequate or no protection to women who report their assaults and
attacks, and sometimes are the direct perpetrators of VAW (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees 2015). ORMUSA found that in 12% of VAW cases, the “perpetrators were the
judges, prosecutors, lawyers, or police officers in the communities in question” (Global
Americans 2018). Similarly, more than six different police officers murdered their female
partners in 2012, reports ORMUSA (Lakhani 2013). Calling the PNC to intervene in DV or IPV
disputes is frowned upon, and sometimes seen as a joke, as women know that local authorities
cannot be trusted to protect them or enforce any kind of VAW law (Menjivar 2014, Huttner
2020).
Societal mistrust and suspicion of state institutions to realistically solve any crimes has
led some communities to view local gang leaders as police officers. Some neighborhoods have
turned to gang leaders to solve VAW cases as opposed to going to the police; citizens view the
police as so inefficient, incompetent, and corrupt, that they prefer to turn to gangs to resolve their
problems (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016).
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In addition, police are critically underfunded, and lack the necessary resources to
effectively enforce the laws and to thoroughly investigate all the received complaints
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016b, Overseas Security Advisory Council 2020)
Constant equipment shortages (specifically, radios and vehicles) deter local authority’s abilities
to quickly respond to crimes, thus contributing to lagging times and inability to promptly
intervene in critical VAW situations. Police are also overwhelmed with gang violence and male
homicide cases, thus making VAW and female homicide investigations last-priority
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2016b).
The Salvadoran police force appears to be operating outside the purview and authority of
the state. The PNC is riddled with corruption, and is seen by society as part of the problem rather
than part of the solution to VAW, thus dissuading many women to report their abuse. Local
authorities appear to be unable to seriously enforce and effectively intervene in VAW instances.
The inefficacy of the PNC has indeed permitted VAW to be perpetuated and tolerated.
While the government has passed seemingly solid VAW laws that should address and
mitigate the problem, they are limited in scope, underfunded, and poorly enforced. Institutional
biases make prosecution of VAW laws almost impossible, and impunity and an overwhelmed
and poorly trained police force has forced women to tolerate this violence on their own.
Realistically, these laws are failing to protect women from VAW, and function effectively as
diplomatic formalities. The Salvadoran government’s incompetence and indifference to properly
enforcing its laws and mechanisms in place to mitigate VAW leads me to believe that the
country is not confidently addressing its high VAW levels.
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This chapter has highlighted the long-term traumas of the civil war, the role of gangs,
women’s resources, and the incompetence of the Salvadoran government as potential causal
factors of the country’s extremely high contemporary female homicide rate. The available data
indicate that the strongest evidence is in favor of the gang hypothesis. Gang members’ violent
and misogynistic views toward women have contributed to a culture of fear and violence. The
extortion fees that gang members force individuals to pay has made proper VAW legislation
enforcement nearly impossible; in 60% of El Salvador, the gang functions as the state (Martínez
n.d.). The plummeting of female homicides during the gang truce (2012-14) provides convincing
evidence that gangs do indeed have a notable influence on female homicide rates. Deeply
intertwined with gang proliferation, the unresolved trauma of the civil war also appears to play a
very important role in contributing to VAW in El Salvador. Although direct testimony about
VAW post-war was not widely available to test my hypothesis, available data (including crossnational data) do suggest that the civil war has contributed to the normalization of murder (of
both men and women), and the proliferation of a culture of death.8 While rising female autonomy
during the war appears to have contributed to violent male backlash through increased DV and
IPV rates, the post-war period also led to the formations of several autonomous women’s groups,
solidifying the beginnings of the feminist movement in El Salvador. These organizations have
been pivotal in formulating and pushing through VAW legislation in El Salvador. While feminist
influence over the Salvadoran government does appear to be growing, on-the-ground
enforcement of VAW laws does not appear to be effective. An underfunded, corrupt, and
incompetent law enforcement agency, coupled with a biased and overwhelmed judicial system
has led to impunity for VAW perpetrators, and the non-prioritization of VAW cases. Evidence

8
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corroborates that gangs and civil war legacies have indeed contributed to heightened female
homicide rates, and the indifference and incompetence of the Salvadoran state has only worsened
the situation for women. Thus, I posit that increased women’s education and strengthened
autonomous Salvadoran women’s groups and vital in advancing the role of women in Salvadoran
society.
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VIII. Conclusion
What is contributing to El Salvador’s extraordinarily high contemporary female homicide
rate? And, more importantly, what is being done to combat it? Using a cross-disciplinary and
intersectional framework, this study sought to highlight the ways in which historical and
contemporary factors have led to extremely high levels of VAW within El Salvador. Historically,
the Salvadoran state has used violence as a means to exert power against its citizens. Massacres
such as La Matanza, El Mozote, and other state-sanctioned atrocities that took place during the
civil war usually had gendered dimensions (rape, sexual violence), underscoring women’s
subordinate place in the male patriarchy. Cross-national findings and VAW statistics from within
El Salvador seem to concur that civil war traumas have contributed in part to heightened female
homicide rates post-war.
Evidence does indeed suggest that contemporary gang proliferation in the region has
exacerbated pre-existing problems. Both cross-nationally and within El Salvador, strong gang
activity is correlated with high female homicide rates. Much qualitative and quantitative
evidence from within El Salvador points to gang members’ misogynist attitudes and
objectification of women as contributors to an atmosphere that normalizes VAW, and female
homicide. But gangs seem to be a piece of a larger institutional problem. The Salvadoran
government is weak, and unable to address this VAW epidemic. Overwhelmed, underfunded,
and prejudiced, the state is both incompetent and indifferent to the dangers that women face
within Salvadoran society. Autonomous women’s organizations have made strides to mitigate
VAW levels by pushing through laws that promote gender equality and by creating shelters and
educating women on their sexual and financial rights, but the laws are rarely enforced, and the
organizations consistently lack funding.
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It is important to recall that international factors—specifically U.S. intervention and
destabilization of El Salvador—have been intimately involved in the creation of El Salvador’s
violent present. The country’s civil war and gang violence are direct consequences of U.S.
policies. Insofar as VAW in El Salvador is a result of this inter-generational trauma and violence,
the U.S. must have a part in solving some of these problems.
My multi-method approach and engagement with cross-disciplinary hypotheses has
highlighted that female homicide must be studied through an intersectional lens in order to more
completely grasp the multiple factors that contribute to this violence. Through this framework, I
have underscored the inter-generational layers of trauma, as well as the institutional failures on
the part of the state to eradicate this violence. Employing an interdisciplinary approach to
answering my research question has emphasized how Salvadoran women are politically, socially,
and historically at a disadvantage.
In a country that struggles with rampant gang activity, high homicide rates, and high levels
of both economic and gender inequality, my study highlights El Salvador’s VAW rates as a
means to better understand how the advancement of women is key for economic progress and
democracy. The recent influx of individuals from El Salvador arriving to the U.S.-Mexico border
in search of asylum is directly linked with my study. For this reason, it is imperative to better
understand the root causes and explanations for VAW in El Salvador, and what can be done to
ensure that women in El Salvador—and across the globe—can enjoy a life free from violence.
My study has highlighted the necessity of strengthening women’s organizations within El
Salvador. These feminist groups not only have political influence, but they also provide women
with access to resources (educational, medical, legal) that the government is realistically failing
to provide. If the international community truly has a stake in improving women’s lives in El
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Salvador, they must focus their attention on supporting these women’s groups. Providing women
of the next generation with resources—educational and organizational—could be a key way to
advance El Salvador. This thesis has highlighted that women are most powerful and influential
when they act collectively.
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